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Losing Bargain: Why Winner-
Take-All Vote Assignment is the 
Electoral College’s Least 
Defensible Feature 
Katherine Florey† 
Abstract 
The electoral college is usually considered as a single institution 
that—in contrast to a system of direct election—mediates the popular 
will and advances counter-majoritarian principles. To its critics, this 
role is a destructive one; the electoral college thwarts the foundational 
democratic idea that all votes should count equally and the majority’s 
choice should lead. By contrast, defenders of the electoral college argue 
that it is a deliberately crafted institution whose deviations from na-
tionwide popular sentiment are part of its design. Yet the electoral 
college is not a single institution but rather a combination of pro-
cedures. The electoral college produces results potentially different from 
those that would be achieved by direct election through several distinct 
mechanisms, including the two-vote bonus given to all states, the 
assignment of electoral votes based on total population rather than 
voters, and the award of state electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis. 
Of these mechanisms, the use of winner-take-all rules stands out as the 
least defensible. In contrast to other aspects of the electoral college, 
winner-take-all systems were not part of the electoral college’s original 
design and were adopted haphazardly at the state level, without sys-
tematic consideration of their national consequences. Further, winner-
take-all rules cause considerable harm by contributing most strongly to 
the risk of popular-electoral splits, by creating incentives for fraud, 
voter suppression, and other undesirable campaign tactics, and by arbi-
trarily privileging some voters’ preferences at others’ expense. As a 
result, advocates for electoral college reform should make abolition of 
winner-take-all central to both their critiques of the current process and 
their evaluation of reform proposals. 
 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. I wish to 
thank John Patrick Hunt, Derek T. Muller, Jae Ha, Aviva Simon, Kevin 
Johnson, and Madhavi Sunder for helpful contributions and support in 
writing this Article. 
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Introduction 
Even as the electoral college has, for the second time in sixteen 
years, produced a president who did not win the popular vote,1 electoral 
college reform seems in some ways farther away than ever. No recent 
effort to change the manner in which the president is elected has pro-
gressed nearly as far as the proposed Bayh-Celler constitutional amend-
ment to institute a direct election system, which passed the House by 
a wide margin in 1969 but ultimately failed to come to a vote in the 
Senate.2 While the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact—an 
 
1. See infra notes 169–70 (discussing the election of George W. Bush in 2000 
and Donald Trump in 2016).  
2. See Lawrence D. Longley & Alan G. Braun, The Politics of 
Electoral College Reform 139–78 (1972). 
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ingenious idea developed by a group of professors and legislators in the 
wake of the 2000 election3—has been passed by eleven states, its pro-
gress has slowed with no state enacting it into law since New York did 
so in 2014.4 The current president of the United States, who in 2012 
called the electoral college a “disaster for democracy,” has more recently 
hailed it as “actually genius in that it brings all states, including the 
smaller ones, into play.”5 Despite dire warnings in the decades prior to 
the 2000 election that an electoral-popular vote split would be a 
“debacle” and a “disaster,”6 it seems that Americans have, in fact, 
learned to live with such a result as a regular occurrence. Indeed, not 
only have fears that an electoral-popular split would provoke a consti-
tutional crisis failed to materialize, but the country’s apparent ac-
quiescence may even have decreased momentum for a change in the 
process.7 
Despite this discouraging backdrop, this Article argues that it is 
time to take up the discussion again from a new angle. The electoral 
college is usually considered as a single institution that—in contrast to 
a system of direct election—mediates the popular will and advances 
values other than those that would be served by pure direct democracy. 
To its critics, this role is a destructive one; the electoral college thwarts 
the foundational democratic principle that all votes should count equal-
 
3. John R. Koza et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for 
Electing the President by National Popular Vote 281–83 (4th ed. 
2013). 
4. See Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, Nat’l Popular 
Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status [https://perma. 
cc/BR6D-6T76] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). New York originally signed 
onto the compact for a limited time, but made its approval permanent in 
2016. See New York, Nat’l Popular Vote, http://www.national 
popularvote.com/state/ny [https://perma.cc/76RM-KA3D] (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2017). 
5. Glenn Kessler, Trump’s Flip-Flop on the Electoral College: From ‘Disaster’ 
to ‘Genius’, Wash. Post (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/factchecker/wp/2016/11/15/trumps-flip-flop-on-the-electoral-colle 
ge-from-disaster-to-genius/?utm_term=.fb2040100ad9 [https://perma.cc/J7Z 
D-RQNT]. 
6. David W. Abbott & James P. Levine, Wrong Winner: The Coming 
Debacle in the Electoral College 1 (1991). 
7. Ann Althouse, for example, suggests that the failure of the widely predicted 
outrage to materialize following the 2000 presidential election’s electoral-
popular split reflects the belief that “[t]he numbers that show[] up in the 
popular vote tally [are] . . . arbitrary to some unknown degree” and winning 
the popular vote thus has less “moral sway” than earlier commentators had 
expected. Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Déjà Vu, 95 Nw. U.L. 
Rev. 993, 1012 (2001) (book review). 
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ly and the majority’s choice should lead.8 By contrast, the defenders of 
the electoral college argue that it is a deliberately crafted institution 
whose deviations from nationwide popular sentiment are part of its 
design.9 
Yet the electoral college is not a single institution but rather a 
combination of procedures. The electoral college produces results 
potentially different from those that would be achieved by direct 
election through several distinct mechanisms,10 three of which are cur-
rently significant and relevant.11 First and most obviously, the electoral 
 
8. See, for example, Koza et al., supra note 3, for an exhaustive defense of 
this proposition. 
9. See, e.g., Tara Ross, Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the 
Electoral College 40 (2004) (arguing that the electoral college is one of 
several devices crafted by the Framers to balance majority will against 
protections for minorities); Judith Best, The Case Against Direct 
Election of the President: A Defense of the Electoral College 
216 (1975) (asserting that the electoral college is part of our “Madisonian 
system of concurrent majorities designed to check majority factions that 
lead to majority tyranny”). 
10. See Althouse, supra note 7, at 996–97 (noting that 1960s reformers 
identified five distinct “areas of concern,” similar to those discussed here, 
about the electoral college: the two bonus electoral votes awarded to each 
state; the “unit” or winner-take-all rule; the possibility of faithless electors; 
the House resolution mechanism; and the potential disparity between the 
popular and electoral vote). 
11. See Lawrence D. Longley & Neal R. Peirce, The Electoral 
College Primer 128 (1996) (describing these elements as potential causes 
of a popular-electoral vote split). In theory, and by its original design, the 
electoral college includes other mechanisms by which it could produce a 
result contrary to the popular vote outcome. First, state legislatures have 
great constitutional latitude to choose the method of appointing electors, 
allowing a state either to select pre-committed electors without regard to the 
popular vote or to appoint electors who would have the power to deviate 
from it. See U.S Const., art. II, § 1 (providing that electors may be 
appointed “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct”). Second, 
the Twelfth Amendment allows the House of Representatives to resolve 
elections in which no candidate has an electoral majority. See U.S Const. 
amend. XII. Because the first mechanism has never been consequential in 
the outcome of an election and the second has not in the post-1824 era of 
modern parties, they are not clearly relevant to the current electoral process 
and this Article will not address them in detail. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that many past calls for electoral college reform have focused on these 
devices, particularly the threat of “faithless electors” who fail to honor the 
voters’ choice in a particular state. See, e.g., Longley & Braun, supra note 
2, at 18 (“The problem of the faithless elector is neither theoretical nor 
unimportant.”). Fears about faithless electors, however, may wane in the 
aftermath of the 2016 electoral process—only seven electors defected from 
their state’s choice despite calls by many prominent figures for them to do 
so based on the popular-electoral vote split and the alleged unfitness of 
Donald Trump for the presidency. See Kyle Cheney, Lessig, Lawyers to Offer 
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college gives a two-vote non-population-based bonus to each state, 
sometimes called the “constant two”,12 thus relatively advantaging 
smaller states at the expense of larger ones. Many critics—and, in some 
cases, defenders—of the electoral college have tended to focus primarily 
on this feature, presumably because the manner in which it advantages 
small states’ voters is readily apparent. Nonetheless, there is wide con-
sensus that the two-vote bonus plays a relatively small role in the 
electoral college’s operation.13 
Second, the electoral college allocates power among states based on 
total population rather than voters, allowing groups such as nonvoters, 
children, noncitizens, and disenfranchised felons to count in the deter-
mination of each state’s relative share of the electoral vote.14 By 
contrast, a system for direct election of the president would by defini-
tion only count those who are eligible to vote and who actually do so. 
This feature of the electoral college is not currently among its most con-
troversial and, unlike the two-vote bonus, it need not necessarily be 
seen as undemocratic, particularly if one believes that the preferences 
of nonvoters are similar enough to those of voters to allow for a sort of 
virtual representation. After all, seats in the House of Representatives 
are apportioned the same way.15 Historically, however, the question 
whether to consider voting population or total population has been a 
major focus of dispute both in the initial design of the electoral college 
and in discussions about the future of apportionment following the Civil 
War.16 
Finally—and with potentially momentous consequences—the 
electoral college overwhelmingly relies on a winner-take-all method of 
allocating state electoral votes, a system historically known as the “unit 
 
Support to Anti-Trump Electors, Politico (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2016/12/larry-lessig-electors-trump-232231 [https:// 
perma.cc/44RB-UFE9] (describing advocacy for anti-Trump votes by 
electors); 2016 Presidential Election Results, 270 to Win, http:// 
www.270towin.com/maps/2016-actual-electoral-map [https://perma.cc/B9 
YE-B4PV] (noting that seven electors in total were “faithless” in the 2016 
electoral vote, including two declining to vote for Trump). 
12. See, e.g., Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 54. 
13. See Carleton W. Sterling, The Electoral College Biases Revealed: The 
Conventional Wisdom and Game Theory Models Notwithstanding, 31 W. 
Pol. Q. 159, 170 (1978) (“The constant two factor is not the most important 
bias in the present system and has never been responsible for upsetting a 
popular vote favorite.”). 
14. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
15. See U.S Const., art. I, § 2. 
16. See infra Part I.B (discussing the antebellum struggle in Congress to replace 
the three-fifths clause with a new method of apportionment). 
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rule.”17 Forty-eight states award electoral votes on a pure winner-take-
all basis—the candidate who gets the most votes in that state receives 
the state’s entire slate of electoral votes, regardless of margin of victory 
or overall percentage. Two states, Maine and Nebraska, use what might 
be called a modified winner-take-all system under which some electoral 
votes are awarded at large to the overall winner while others are award-
ed to the winner of each congressional district.18 
In several important ways, the winner-take-all system differs 
sharply from the electoral college’s other counter-majoritarian pro-
cedures. The first is the manner in which it came into being. In contrast 
to the two-vote bonus and population-based allocation, both of which 
were the subject of extensive historical debate and compromise,19 the 
winner-take-all system evolved haphazardly at the state level, as a 
function of decisions by individual states designed to preserve their in-
fluence, rather than collective deliberation.20 Winner-take-all was not 
envisioned by the Framers, was in no way part of the electoral college’s 
design, and has never been seriously addressed by Congress.21 
Second, the winner-take-all system stands out for the force of its 
influence on results. Of the various electoral college mechanisms, 
winner-take-all has the greatest potential to produce a popular-electoral 
split on its own; it did so in the 2016 election, and it has been a 
significant and probably determinative factor in the popular-electoral 
splits of the past.22 In a large number of additional elections, winner-
 
17. See Longley & Peirce, supra note 11, at 24–25. 
18. See id. at 99 (describing Maine’s arrangement, adopted in 1969, under which 
two votes are determined by district and two others at large, as well as 
Nebraska’s allocation of three of its five votes by congressional district, 
adopted in 1992). Michigan briefly experimented with a similar system in 
the late 19th century, motivated by Democrats seeking to block the state’s 
entire electoral slate from going to the Republican candidate. Id. 
19. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
20. See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text. 
21. The closest Congress has come to specifically considering the issue was in 
1826, when Congress debated an amendment to select electors by 
congressional district. See generally Robert E. Ross, Federalism and the 
Electoral College: The Development of the General Ticket Method for 
Selecting Presidential Electors, 46 Publius: J. Federalism 147, 160–61 
(2016). A district-based system, however, does not permit votes to have 
proportional weight and is not a true alternative to winner-take-all. See infra 
Part I.C (discussing the possibility that state level popular-electoral splits 
could occur under the district-based system). 
22. There have been five elections in U.S. history—1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 
2016—in which the winner of the popular vote did not become president. 
The election of 1824, however, is generally not included with the others 
because approximately a quarter of the states did not allocate their votes 
through popular elections at the time. See Best, supra note 9, at 25. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
323 
take-all allocation came perilously close to creating such a split and 
would have done so with the shift of only a relative handful of votes.23 
Further, even where it does not result in an ultimate victor different 
from the popular vote winner, the winner-take-all system frequently 
produces an electoral result seemingly at odds with the popular will—
magnifying a popular plurality into a decisive win or converting a sig-
nificant but hardly overwhelming victory into a landslide.24 
Third, winner-take-all allocation has numerous pernicious effects on 
the electoral process in addition to its potential impact on outcome. As 
many observers have complained, the winner-take-all system causes 
candidates to focus resources and visits on a handful of close states, 
while slighting or completely ignoring the others.25 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, significant evidence suggests that non-swing states receive less 
attention from presidents while in office and that the concerns of swing-
state voters disproportionately drive the national agenda.26 Winner-
take-all also has a variety of negative effects on the electoral process 
itself. It effectively deprives consistent political minorities within a state 
of any representation in the presidential election.27 It arbitrarily makes 
residents of some states disproportionately influential by giving their 
 
Likewise, the rampant fraud and voter suppression that plagued the 1876 
election has led some commentators to regard the results in that race as 
suspect; that said, the winner-take-all feature of the electoral college played 
a substantial role in the ultimate outcome. Id. Winner-take-all was the 
greatest contributor to the 2016 outcome, as Hillary Clinton would have won 
the electoral vote under a proportional scheme. See Lawrence Lessig, The 
Equal Protection Argument Against ‘Winner-Take-All’ in the Electoral 
College, Medium (Dec. 4, 2016), https://medium.com/equal-citizens/the-
equal-protection-argument-against-winner-take-all-in-the-electoral-college-
b09e8a49d777 [https://perma.cc/FAM2-84A8]. Likewise, the inefficient 
distribution of Grover Cleveland’s votes in 1888 from a winner-take-all 
perspective was a significant contributor to his electoral defeat. Best, supra 
note 9, at 65. Under fractional proportional allocation, George W. Bush 
would have won a bare plurality of less than half an electoral vote, although 
he would not have attained the 270 electoral votes necessary, under current 
rules, to prevent the election from being decided in the House of 
Representatives. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 134–35. (“Even though 
Al Gore led by 537,179 popular votes nationwide, he would have received 
only 268.766 electoral votes, whereas George W. Bush would have received 
269.234 electoral votes.”). 
23. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 255 (explaining that there have been six 
such elections in the past 60 years). 
24. See infra Part II.A.4. 
25. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 434–41. 
26. See id. at 43–47 (noting that swing states tend to benefit more from federal 
funds than other states). 
27. See infra notes 202–204 and accompanying text. 
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votes, in some cases, 30,000 times more power to determine the ultimate 
outcome than is true for votes by residents of other states.28 Moreover, 
because of the immense benefits winner-take-all confers on a candidate 
who ekes out even a tiny plurality, it creates significant incentives to 
engage in state-level fraud, as has occurred in past elections,29 or efforts 
at voter suppression—a problem both historically and currently.30 Nota-
bly, winner-take-all’s potential to produce harmful results has long been 
recognized in the context of party primaries; the Democratic Party, in 
light of these concerns, has prohibited winner-take-all primaries since 
1968,31 and, despite their partial use in the Republican Party, they have 
been the subject of heated criticism from some Republicans, particularly 
during the primary election of 2016.32 
Fourth, the winner-take-all system is notable for its lack of 
historical or intellectual justification. To be sure, all of the electoral 
college’s features that tend to produce results at odds with the popular 
vote are controversial. Both the two-vote bonus and population-based 
allocation, for example, have been associated with efforts to preserve 
slavery and to justify disenfranchisement of particular groups of vot-
ers.33 Both likewise have the potential to create an electoral-popular 
vote split on their own, and the two-vote bonus was in fact a substantial 
contributor to George W. Bush’s 2000 electoral victory.34 Yet both these 
devices—as this Article will go on to discuss—can be defended by 
arguments that, whether or not one agrees with them, are at least 
legitimate and reasoned. Further, both mechanisms are the result of 
national compromises achieved after the consideration of many other 
options.35 
 
28. See infra notes 211–214 and accompanying text. 
29. See Best, supra note 9, at 25 (discussing voter fraud in the 1876 presidential 
election). 
30. See infra Part II.A.2. 
31. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
32. See Terry Connelly, It’s the Delegate Count, Stupid! GOP’s Tricky Primary 
Vote Allocation Rules Mean “Get Down to Three or Trump’s Home Free”, 
Huffington Post (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/terry-
connelly/its-the-delegate-count-st_b_9301800.html [https://perma.cc/Z7R 
D-GCLX] (describing non-proportional delegate allocation rules as a 
“doomsday machine for GOP leaders who fear a Trump nomination”). 
33. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, The Electoral College Is an Instrument of 
White Supremacy—and Sexism, Slate, (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www. 
slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2016/11/11/the_electoral_college_is_an_instr
ument_of_white_supremacy_and_sexism.html [https://perma.cc/7D9C-
HTXA]. 
34. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
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By contrast, states adopted winner-take-all systems with virtually 
no systematic deliberation at the state or national level about their 
overall effects on the process and outcome.36 In most subsequent dis-
cussions of electoral college reform, winner-take-all has been subject to 
blistering criticism, and even those who continue to defend the electoral 
college often ignore or minimize its effects.37 Further, whereas the two-
vote bonus and total-population allocation deviate from the popular 
vote by design, winner-take-all crowns popular-vote losers for entirely 
arbitrary reasons. While the argument, for example, that that small 
states should have sway over the presidential outcome sufficient to 
ensure their relevance is no means incontestable, it is at least colorable. 
By contrast, it is hard to think of a principled justification for permit-
ting an individual New Hampshire resident 30,000 times more influence 
in a presidential election than that of a resident of Wyoming, as one 
analysis suggests has been the case in recent elections.38 
Fifth, from a more pragmatic point of view, a move to change the 
winner-take-all system at the national level potentially lacks one 
obstacle that other electoral college reform efforts have encountered: 
the opposition of states that believe they will lose power if the reforms 
are a success. The bonuses given to states with a small population or a 
large percentage of nonvoters generally play a minor role in the opera-
tion of the electoral college overall. But they may loom larger in the 
calculus of an individual state that may be required to give up half or 
more of its influence if a wholly popular-vote-based system were insti-
tuted. In 1969, for example, a constitutional amendment to abolish the 
electoral college that had passed the House by a wide margin failed in 
the Senate at least in part because of the opposition of small-state sena-
tors, one of whom, Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska, commented, “I’m not 
authorized to reduce the voting power of my state by 20 percent[.]”39 
 
36. See infra note 107 (noting that the states “succumbed” to the pressure of 
winner-take-all). 
37. See infra Part III.A. 
38. See infra notes 211–214 and accompanying text. 
39. Electoral College Reform Victim of Senate Filibuster, CQ Almanac 1970 
(1971), https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal70-
1291702. To be sure, a move away from winner-take-all would also shrink 
the immediate influence of current battleground states. But because only a 
handful of states enjoy battleground status to begin with and those states 
shift somewhat from election to election, it is far less clear that such a change 
would produce permanent winners and losers. Further, while winner-take-all 
grants additional influence to battleground states, that influence comes at 
the expense of accurate representation of its population: Because 
battleground states are by definition closely divided, awarding all votes to 
one candidate or another ensures that the wishes of approximately half their 
voters are entirely ignored in presidential elections. 
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This Article argues that, for all these reasons, critiques of the 
electoral college should focus on winner-take-all as its primary fault. 
This is not to say that objections to the electoral college’s other undem-
ocratic mechanisms are unjustified or that more sweeping reform 
proposals are not a viable solution. Indeed, it is obvious, for example, 
that direct election of the president by popular vote would immediately 
eliminate the problems brought about by winner-take-all. Nonetheless, 
arguments against the electoral college should focus on winner-take-all 
because it causes the most harm with the least justification. Further, a 
national reform effort that narrowly targeted winner-take-all—even 
while preserving the electoral college’s other counter-majoritarian 
features—would be a vast improvement over the current system, pro-
ducing less arbitrary outcomes and fewer attendant difficulties.40 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I details the development 
of the three mechanisms discussed—the two-vote bonus, population-
based electoral vote allocation, and the winner-take-all system—arguing 
that the third differs sharply from the former two in the degree of 
deliberation with which it was adopted and the extent to which it repre-
sents a reasoned national compromise. Part II details the many ways in 
which winner-take-all has had deleterious effects on both the presi-
dential election process and the fair representation of all state citizens. 
Part III discusses past and present efforts at electoral college reform 
and how these should be evaluated in light of the concerns attending 
the winner-take-all system. This Article concludes by arguing for a 
focus on eliminating winner-take-all in efforts to make the U.S. presi-
dential election process fairer and less arbitrary. 
I. The Historical Development of the Electoral 
College’s Counter-majoritarian Features 
Three mechanisms exist through which the electoral college could 
plausibly yield a result that diverges from the popular vote: the two-
vote bonus, the allocation of electoral votes based on population, and 
the award of electoral votes, in 48 states, on a purely winner-take-all 
basis. These features, while often considered together, have very differ-
 
40. An example of such a proposal is Senator Howard Cannon’s proposed 
constitutional amendment in 1969 to replace winner-take-all with a system 
under which each state’s electoral votes would be apportioned to three 
decimal places based on the proportion of the state vote received by each 
candidate. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 130–32. Such proposals bring their 
own problems to be resolved, such as the need to splinter electoral votes and 
the worry that a substantial showing by a third-party candidate could throw 
many elections into the House of Representatives. As this Article will argue, 
however, there are acceptable solutions to these issues, some of which have 
already been pioneered in party primary systems. 
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ent histories and justifications, and differ in the overall contribution 
they have made to electoral results. The following Section traces the 
development of each of these mechanisms in turn. 
A. The “Constant Two” Small-State Bonus 
When electoral college critics enumerate the institution’s flaws, 
they have often focused on the effects of the two-vote bonus given to 
each state to represent its senators41—a bonus that is provided to all 
states but that, like the Senate itself, has the effect of giving low-
population states disproportionate representation. Legal scholars, for 
example, have characterized the electoral college as “skew[ing] some-
what away from one-person, one-vote, and in favor of smaller states 
because of the extra two votes attributable to Senate seats.”42 This 
feature, it is argued, “dramatically increases the possibility that the less 
popular candidate becomes President” because “representation in the 
Senate is unrelated to population.”43 A frequently cited example of this 
disparity compares the electoral representation of the most populous 
state, California, where an electoral vote represents approximately three 
times more people than it does in the lowest-population state, 
Wyoming.44 
In popular and media discussions, commentators often emphasize 
the effects of the two-vote bonus as well.45 Following Al Gore’s loss in 
the electoral college despite a half-million popular vote victory, atten-
tion again focused on the small-state bias. For example, in a New York 
Times opinion piece entitled It Pays to Win the Small States, Alex 
Keyssar argued that George W. Bush’s electoral college victory was 
 
41. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 1 (providing that a state’s electoral votes should 
be “equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress”).  
42. Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban Disadvantage 
in National and State Lawmaking, 77 La. L. Rev. 287, 334 (2016). 
43. Jack M. Beermann, The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need 
One and How Would We Get One?, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 711, 736 (2014). 
44. See, e.g., Koza et al., supra note 3, at 56 n.114; see also Katy Collin, The 
Electoral College Badly Distorts the Vote. And It’s Going to Get Worse., 
Wash. Post (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/17/the-electoral-college-badly-distorts-the-vote-
and-its-going-to-get-worse/?utm_term=.a15687a38c5c [https://perma.cc/JQ 
4Z-BU56]. 
45. See Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 Akron 
L. Rev. 717, 722 (2007) (“Civics class wisdom has it that the Electoral 
College system expresses values of federalism by encouraging candidates to 
vie for small states because those states are disproportionately represented 
by virtue of the two votes that each state receives under the Senate add-on 
feature of the Electoral College.”). 
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attributable to his strong performance in small-population states, 
concluding that “[t]hose who tout the virtues of the Electoral College 
should confront the mathematical reality of the inequities they are 
defending.”46 In the wake of another electoral-popular split in 2016, 
Donald Trump’s electoral victory was frequently attributed to the two-
vote bonus and the resultant small-state advantage. In the Washington 
Post, Katy Collin argued that small-state overrepresentation “distorts 
the popular vote in a way that disproportionately rewards those who 
live in scarcely populated areas,” noting that large state and small state 
disparities in representation have increased since the electoral college 
first came into being, and are likely to continue to worsen.47 Despite re-
minders that the winner-take-all features of the electoral college tend 
to overwhelm the effects of the two-vote bonus,48 the idea that the main 
effect of the electoral college is to advantage small states persists. 
To some extent, this focus is rooted in history. At the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787, tensions between large and small states 
were the “most profound and dangerous of [the] conflicts”49 that 
emerged. The Connecticut Plan, or “Great Compromise,” settled this 
issue at least as to representation, ensuring states equal representation 
in one house of Congress and population-based representation for the 
other.50 Yet the problem resurfaced in the debates about how to choose 
a president. As delegates settled on the idea of an electoral college, the 
adoption of the two-vote bonus was driven by the smaller states, who 
“clearly were concerned that in a straight-out popular election [for 
president] the larger states would overwhelm them.”51 A particular 
concern was that voters would tend to throw their support to a candi-
date from their own state, giving large-state candidates an inherent 
 
46. Alex Keyssar, It Pays to Win the Small States, N.Y. Times (Nov. 20, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/20/opinion/it-pays-to-win-the-small-
states.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/4S68-PJW8]. 
47. Collin, supra note 44. 
48. See Nate Cohn, Why Trump Had an Edge in the Electoral College, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/why-
trump-had-an-edge-in-the-electoral-college.html [https://perma.cc/M8FQ-
6Z55] (explaining that, while critics of the two-vote bonus “have a point,” 
ultimately “Mr. Trump won for a simple reason: The Electoral College’s 
(largely) winner-take-all design gives a lot of weight to battleground states”). 
49. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 23. 
50. Id. 
51. Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an 
Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. Am. Hist. 35, 40 
(1986). 
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advantage.52 While the delegates’ concerns about the process of select-
ing an executive ranged widely, a key factor in winning over small states 
was the proposal to combine Senate and House representation in deter-
mining a state’s number of electors—thus ensuring that each state 
would receive no less than three electoral votes, and the electoral vote 
disparity between the largest and smallest states would be reduced from 
about 10:1, as it would be if a purely population-based scheme were 
used, to about 4:1.53 In reaching this agreement, which has been 
described as a “jerry-built contraption” designed with the comforting 
foreknowledge that George Washington would be selected as president 
in any case,54 the delegates were guided less by “some grand concept of 
political theory”55 than by more practical considerations,56 foremost 
among them the need to resolve the differences between large and small 
states.57 
Although the two-vote bonus was important in fashioning 
agreement at the Constitutional Convention between large and small 
states about how the president should be elected, commentators have 
noted overwhelmingly that the benefit it confers upon small states is 
modest and generally overwhelmed by the impact of winner-take-all, 
which magnifies the importance of winning large states.58 Candidates 
can simply garner the required electoral votes to become president more 
 
52. Id. (citing comments of Roger Sherman of Connecticut in The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. 2, 29 (Max Farrand, ed. 1937)). 
53. See Slonim, supra note 51, at 51–52 (describing the inclusion of Senate 
representation in determining electoral votes as “the really critical point” for 
small states). 
54. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 11. 
55. See Slonim, supra note 51, at 57. 
56. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 10 (“It has been argued that the 
electoral college scheme was less a product of wisdom and philosophy than 
the result of a practical compromise.”). 
57. See Slonim, supra note 51, at 57–58. 
58. See Michael J. O’Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2421, 2428–31 (1992) (observing that while the two-vote 
bonus superficially appears to give more power to the small states, the 
greater effect of winner-take-all makes the bonus largely irrelevant); Abbott 
& Levine, supra note 6, at 78 (explaining that the electoral college’s “modest 
small-state apportionment bias is more than offset by a much larger 
countervailing bias favoring the largest states, one that results from the 
winner-take-all feature of the electoral college system and from the patterns 
of two-party competition in the states”) (emphasis omitted). Indeed, the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention probably recognized as much. 
See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that “if anything, [the 
electoral college] was seen as favoring large states—or at least the principle 
of population”). 
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easily if they win states that have more of them. Thus, small states’ 
influence on the outcome tends in most elections to be minimal, 
although the 2000 election is a partial exception.59 Further, small states 
tend to receive little attention from candidates during presidential cam-
paigns,60 particularly because many of the smaller states are dominated 
by one political party and thus are unlikely to be in play in presidential 
elections.61 Finally, at least from a broad historical perspective, the two-
vote bonus has not tended to consistently advantage one party over the 
other.62 Yet despite the modest impact the two-vote bonus has generally 
had, it has tended to dominate popular commentary about the electoral 
college. Further, although some small states have supported past efforts 
at electoral college reform, others have worried about the loss of influ-
ence that eliminating the bonus would entail.63 
 
59. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
60. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 450. 
61. Almost three decades ago, Abbott and Levine observed that “most of the 
states with fewer than ten electoral votes are presidentially noncompetitive.” 
See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 81. This remained the case in the 
2010s. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 444 (noting that “[c]ampaign events 
were held in only three of the 25 smallest states in 2012”). 
62. Of the last four elections, for example, the bonus has favored Democrats in 
2008 and 2012 and Republicans in 2004 and 2016; in none of these elections 
would eliminating the bonus have altered the electoral result. See generally 
David Leip, 2016 Presidential General Election Results, Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3MX-P2EG] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). It should be noted, 
however, that an exception to the general irrelevance of the two-vote bonus 
to the result is the 2000 election. Al Gore would have won that election had 
the two bonus votes been subtracted from every state and would likely not 
have won had the two-vote bonus been maintained but electoral votes 
allocated proportionally within states. Even among the four split electoral-
popular vote elections, however, the 2000 election is unusual for the 
exceptional closeness of both the popular vote and the electoral vote. In that 
election, Gore’s winning margin was 0.51 percent of the popular vote, but 
Bush won 271 to 267 electoral votes—though Gore ultimately received only 
266 votes due to a faithless elector. See id. By contrast, in the 2016 election, 
which again featured split winners but a more lopsided popular and electoral 
vote, Hillary Clinton would not have won the electoral vote even had the 
two-vote bonus been eliminated, yet would have won a bare majority of 
electoral votes had proportional rather than winner-take-all allocation been 
in effect. See Lessig, supra note 22 (demonstrating that Clinton would have 
won 270 electoral votes with proportional allocation, regardless of whether 
or not rounding was used). This analysis assumed a 5 percent popular vote 
threshold for receiving proportional electoral votes. Id. 
63. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text; T.R. Reid, Direct 
Presidential Election Again Sought by Sen. Bayh, Wash. Post (Jan. 28, 
1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/01/28/ 
direct-presidential-election-again-sought-by-sen-bayh/312e9eb5-3418-486f-
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B. Population-Based Representation in the Electoral Vote 
The electoral college’s allocation of voting power based on popula-
tion is only occasionally discussed in modern critiques, but the issue has 
been an important one historically. At the Constitutional Convention, 
the Connecticut Compromise—which divided legislative representation 
between one population-based body and one in which each state would 
have two votes—had already revealed common ground between the 
slave and small states. 64 During the Convention, small states and slave 
states likewise allied against a system of popular election, albeit for 
opposite reasons: the small states wanted a system not strictly based 
on population to protect them from what they saw as a large-state bias, 
while the slave states wanted to leverage the representational ad-
vantage they gained from the disenfranchised slave population, which 
counted three-fifths of the free population for purposes of both 
congressional and electoral representation.65 
Despite initial conflicts between northern states that wanted to 
exclude slaves from the basis of representation and southern states that 
wanted them to count equally, the delegates fairly readily agreed on 
the notorious solution under which the slave population would count 
three-fifths of the free population.66 The three-fifths clause was in 
keeping with the delegates’ still-inchoate ideas about the fundamental 
nature of democratic representation, in which the concept was linked 
to property and labor67—the expenses of the earlier Confederation, for 
example, had been apportioned on the basis of the relative value of real 
estate in each state.68 Yet while the three-fifths formula initially “went 
over rather smoothly” during the convention and later ratification, it 
ultimately came to be perceived as “a major victory for the 
South . . . consistently augment[ing] southern representation in the 
 
8ffacf6e436b62df/?utm_term=.5147e7aa92bb [https://perma.cc/Q6DX-
8V9B] (noting a Nevada senator’s opposition to direct election on the 
grounds that small states would be ignored). 
64. Slonim, supra note 51, at 41. 
65. Id. 
66. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance 
in American Law and Politics 20 (1978). 
67. See id. at 21–22 (quoting Charles C. Pinckney’s statement during the 
ratification debates as characterizing the three-fifths apportionment 
mechanism as a method of assessing “productive labor of [our] inhabitants” 
and providing the south “representation for our property”). Though such 
statements are sometimes regarded as evidence that delegates viewed slaves 
as property, Fehrenbacher argues that they were more a product of the 
delegates’ “muddled thinking” about the nature of representation and the 
“widespread belief in the relative inefficiency of slave labor.” Id.  
68. Id. at 19–20. 
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House by thirty per cent or more.”69 The super-representation of 
southern whites in the House obviously enhanced their power in the 
electoral college as well and allowed them, in the years leading up to 
the Civil War, to dominate all branches of government through what 
Don E. Fehrenbacher has described as “a kind of holding-company 
arrangement, in which the South was the majority section within the 
Democratic party, and the Democrats were the majority party of the 
nation.”70 Though northerners chafed at this disproportionate southern 
influence, they saw little hope of changing the three-fifths clause, built 
as it was into the structure of the Constitution.71 
After the Civil War, however, the legislators of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress turned with renewed attention to the issue of how repre-
sentation should be determined. As Congress debated various provisions 
in what was to become the Fourteenth Amendment, it had to grapple 
with the same fundamental issue the Constitutional Convention had 
faced—how to allocate representation in a world where women and 
freedmen made up a large share of the population but were still gen-
erally disenfranchised.72 The legislators turned a serious eye to this task, 
conscious of its momentousness. As one representative put it, “The 
footprints of this Congress will be upon the rocks of the 
mountains. . . . [T]here has never been a day . . . when . . . the wisdom 
of Congress has been so imperatively demanded as now.”73 
The Republican-controlled Congress was acutely aware that the 
three-fifths compromise had allowed slave states to expand their influ-
ence in Congress and the electoral college, and was determined that the 
postwar South must not be permitted to engage in the same maneuver. 
Legislators feared the scenario in which the ex-Confederate states would 
be able to expand the power of their white population at the federal 
level by counting disenfranchised freedman in determining their repre-
sentation. Various representatives railed at the unfairness of using 
former slaves to bolster the representation of former slaveholders who 
refused to allow the freedmen equal civil privileges.74 
 
69. Id. at 20. 
70. Id. at 511. 
71. Id. at 20–21. 
72. See Ellen Carol DuBois, Woman Suffrage and Women’s Rights 93–
94 (1998). 
73. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) [hereinafter Globe] 
(comments of Rep. Woodbridge). 
74. As Rep. Conkling explained: “The three-fifths rule gave the slaveholding 
States over and above their just representation . . . [t]he new situation will 
enable those States when relationships are resumed, to claim twenty-eight 
Representatives [representing their black population] beside their just 
proportion. Twenty-eight votes to be cast here and in the Electoral College 
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Exactly how to avoid this scenario, however, was a more difficult 
question. Legislators were skeptical that a constitutional amendment 
directly enfranchising blacks could be ratified by the required number 
of states.75 Further, while earlier notions that had linked representation 
to labor or property no longer found widespread adherence, there was 
no obvious consensus around an alternative model. A possible solution 
that emerged was to base congressional—and thus electoral college—
representation solely on the voting population, putting ex-Confederate 
states to a choice between giving freedmen the vote or effectively 
accepting a reduced representation in Congress and in presidential con-
tests.76 As one representative urged, such a plan would reflect “the 
fundamental idea of all just representation, that every voter should be 
equal in political power all over the Union.”77 
Various legislators, however, raised objections to this plan. Some 
pointed out, for example, that it would unfairly benefit the western 
states, which were predominantly male and thus had a higher pro-
portion of voters.78 Legislators further argued that adult male voters 
could take into account the interests of their female or minor family 
members, who would be excluded from such virtual representation if 
only voters were considered.79 Others contended that states might seek 
 
for those held not fit to sit as jurors, not fit to testify in court, not fit to be 
plaintiff in a suit, not fit to approach the ballot-box.” Id. at 357 (comments 
of Rep. Conkling). 
75. See id. at 879 (comments of Sen. Hendricks) (arguing that Section 2 was a 
disguised attempt at black enfranchisement from legislators who “dare not 
go before the [state] [l]egislatures for the ratification of the direct 
proposition”). See also 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 
Transformations 106 (1998) (noting that congressional Republicans were 
“painfully aware” that only a handful of northern states had granted blacks 
the vote). 
76. See Globe, supra note 73, at 141 (comments of Rep. Blaine) (describing 
various proposals to “mak[e] suffrage instead of population the basis of 
apportioning Representatives”). 
77. See id. at 404 (comments of Rep. Lawrence) (objecting to population-based 
representation on the grounds that it lacked this feature of just 
representation). 
78. See id. at 141 (comments of Rep. Blaine) (explaining how the plan would 
benefit California, a state with a high population of vote-eligible men); id. at 
357 (comments of Rep. Conkling) (mocking the view that objections to 
suffrage-based proposals were based on “the fear of taking away power from 
fanatical New England”); id. at 433 (comments of Rep. Broomall) 
(suggesting that a voter-based scheme might cause “injustice . . . between 
the extreme East and the extreme West”). 
79. Rep. Blaine, for example, argued that “no one will deny that population is 
the true basis of representation; for women, children, and other non-voting 
classes may have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those 
who actually deposit the ballot.” Id. at 141 (comments of Rep. Blaine). 
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to gain an advantage by rushing to grant the vote to women, minors, 
new residents, or foreigners—a “strife of unbridled suffrage,” according 
to Rep. Roscoe Conkling.80 Finally, some suggested that allocating 
representation on the basis of voters might be considered as tacitly 
approving continuing disenfranchisement of freedmen.81 
An alternative possibility, one around which Congress eventually 
coalesced after long debate, was to continue to calculate House and 
electoral representation on the basis of population, but to penalize any 
disenfranchisement of the adult male population. In final form, Section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was an effort to accomplish this 
purpose, continuing the apportionment of representation on the basis 
of states’ “respective numbers,” but going on to provide that should the 
vote be “denied to any of the [adult] male inhabitants of such State, 
being . . . citizens . . . except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the pro-
portion [to the percentage of the population disenfranchised].”82 The 
inclusion of the word “male”83—the first-ever reference to sex in the 
 
Likewise, Rep. Bromwell argued that “[l]adies are a part of the family with 
most of us,” such that their interests could be considered by male voters, 
while blacks were “not . . . of the white family” and required the ability to 
vote on their own behalf to ensure their perspectives would be represented. 
See id. at 410 (comments of Rep. Bromwell). See also id. at 411 (comments 
of Rep. Cook) (arguing that women and children “are represented, in the 
true sense of that word, by their fathers and brothers”). Conversely, others 
noted the distortion in the preferences of blacks inherent in including them 
in the basis of representation but denying them the vote: “[A]n oppressed 
race should not lend power to their oppressors,” argued Rep. Donnelly. Id. 
at 377 (comments of Rep. Donnelly). 
80. See id. at 357 (comments of Rep. Conkling). Rep. Blaine likewise spoke of a 
possible “unseemly scramble” to extend suffrage to groups such as foreigners. 
See id. at 141 (comments of Rep. Blaine). 
81. See, e.g., id. at 536 (comments of Rep. Stevens) (addressing arguments that 
representation-reducing mechanisms gave an “implied permission” to states 
to regulate the franchise more restrictively); id. at 673 (comments of Sen. 
Charles Sumner) (objecting to the proposal as a “delusion and a snare” that 
would constitute tacit acquiescence in disenfranchisement by race). 
82. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. 
83. Initial versions of the amendment were phrased differently; an earlier draft 
provided that “whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged 
in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color 
shall be excluded from the basis of representation.” Globe, supra note 73, 
at 351 (comments of Rep. Stevens). Some representatives objected to this 
language on grounds that it would make it too difficult to impose 
qualifications, such as literacy, on the franchise. See, e.g., id. at 355 
(comments of Rep. Rogers) (arguing that a literacy requirement that barred 
one black man from voting would trigger this provision and prevent all black 
men in the state at issue from counting towards that state’s population). 
Others wondered about effects on exclusion of other minority groups, such 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
335 
U.S. Constitution84—was controversial85 and opposed by woman 
suffrage advocates,86 but it solved a difficult problem—how to dis-
advantage states that disenfranchised on the basis of race in a country 
not yet ready to exact a similar penalty for failing to extend the 
franchise to women.87 Senator Charles Sumner is reported to have said 
that he “wrote over nineteen pages of foolscap [in an effort] to get rid 
of the word ‘male’ and yet keep ‘negro suffrage’ as a party measure 
intact; but it could not be done.”88 
Although the subsequent passage of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
amendments has mooted some of the arguments separating proponents 
of voter-based and population-based schemes, the dispute remains rele-
vant in many respects.89 States still differ markedly in their non-voting 
population percentages, in some cases because of voter turnout dif-
ferences, in others because of relatively larger populations of children, 
non-citizens, or felons.90 Further, perspectives on the fairness of this 
 
as Chinese immigrants, see e.g., id. at 376 (comments of Rep. Brooks); 
suggested that the categories of race and color might be underinclusive, see 
e.g., id. at 409 (comments of Rep. Bromwell) (discussing other possible 
requirements states could enact resulting in disenfranchisement on other 
grounds); or worried about practical problems of administration, see e.g., id. 
at 535 (comments of Sen. Benjamin) (referencing Missouri’s requirement 
that, in order to vote, men had to take an oath that they did not aid or give 
comfort to the enemy during “the rebellion”). 
84. See DuBois, supra note 72, at 93 (“The amendment included the first 
reference in the Constitution to the distinction of sex.”). 
85. Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, for example, objected to an initial proposal to use 
the word “male,” stating, “[w]hy has [Rep. Schenck, the author] used that 
word ‘male’? It was never in the Constitution of the United States before. 
Why make a crusade against women in the Constitution of the nation?” 
Globe, supra note 73, at 536 (comments of Rep. Stevens). 
86. See DuBois, supra note 72, at 93–94. 
87. See 2 Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., History of Woman Suffrage 
91 (1881) (noting that legislators reportedly remarked that “[s]uffrage for 
black men will be all the strain the Republican party can stand”). 
88. Id. 
89. For more contemporary takes on the issue of population-based 
apportionment and virtual representation, see Joseph Fishkin, Weightless 
Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1888 (2012) (discussing the tension between 
representation based on the voting population and the total population of a 
jurisdiction, and how the current system protects certain numerical groups), 
and Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes on Account 
of Their Children?: Toward A Conversational Understanding of American 
Democracy, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (2000) (applying the concept of “one 
person, one vote” to parents with minor children).  
90. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746–47 (1973) (“The proportion of 
the census population too young to vote or disqualified by alienage or 
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situation continue to differ. Some have argued in particular against 
what has been called the practice of “prison gerrymandering”—counting 
disenfranchised prison populations as part of their place of incarceration 
rather than as part of their home communities91—or objected more 
generally that any alignment of interests between ineligible adults and 
the voting population is, at best, “highly uncertain.”92 In contrast, other 
commentators have spoken in favor of population-based representation, 
noting, for example, that it enables a “fairly simple assessment of the 
balance of political power by counting population”93 and cautioning that 
“[t]here is value in having a government that represents all of the people 
living in its jurisdiction and subject to its laws, a value we ought not 
to trade away lightly.”94 Many of these arguments echo those made at 
the Constitutional Convention and, especially, at the 39th Congress: Is 
it wrong to include nonvoters in a state’s power base when their 
political preferences may be quite different from those of the voting 
population? Or, conversely, should populations, such as young children, 
that cannot vote for some good reason nonetheless be entitled to be 
included in determining a state’s political clout?95 Historically, these 
issues have proved difficult to resolve, and they have the potential to 
continue to cause controversy today.  
C. The Evolution of Winner-Take-All 
In contrast to the two-vote bonus and population-based apportion-
ment, the use of winner-take-all electoral vote allocation, also called the 
“unit rule,”96 was not adopted at a national level. Although the Consti-
tution provided for the appointment of electors “in such Manner as the 
 
nonresidence varies substantially among the States and among localities 
within the States.”). 
91. See Michael Skocpol, Note, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison 
Gerrymandering, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1473, 1476 (2017) (summarizing 
arguments that “counting inmates at their prison ‘residences’ deprives their 
home communities—disproportionately minority, urban, and poor—of 
political clout they might otherwise enjoy if prisoners were counted at their 
preincarceration addresses”). 
92. Bennett, supra note 89, at 533. Bennett does note nonetheless that, however 
imperfect, “there may . . . be no practical alternative” to a scheme of virtual 
representation for nonvoting populations. Id. at 535. 
93. Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 Ariz. 
St. L.J. 1237, 1249 (2012). 
94. Fishkin, supra note 89, at 1910. 
95. See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
96. See Abbot & Levine, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the adoption of the 
unit rule by state governments, “one state follow[ing] another in switching 
to a winter-take-all system”). 
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[state] Legislature[s] . . . may direct,”97 the winner-take-all system was, 
to begin with, not a part of the delegates’ original vision for the electoral 
college; there was no discussion of the idea in either the Constitutional 
Convention or the Federalist Papers.98 Indeed, a practice like winner-
take-all was inherently inconsistent with the original premise of the 
electoral college, under which independent electors would exercise rea-
soned deliberation in choosing among candidates.99 
This original vision of the electors, however, soon proved income-
patible with a system dominated by political parties, and by 1796 it 
had become apparent that “the processes of selection of the electors in 
the states would be dominated by partisan, not personal, consider-
ations.”100 Even as the electoral college’s nature and function became 
blurred, however, winner-take-all mechanisms scarcely came into play; 
while three states established winner-take-all voting in the first election 
of 1789, all had repealed it by 1800.101 Meanwhile, problems had begun 
to arise with the workings of the electoral college, under which each 
elector cast two votes and the runner-up became vice president.102 In 
1796, this resulted in a president and vice president from different 
parties, while in 1800, Jefferson became locked in a tie with his running 
mate Aaron Burr in an election ultimately resolved in the House after 
lengthy and tumultuous proceedings.103 As a result of these clear break-
downs of the electoral college process, momentum quickly built for re-
form, and by September 1804, in time for that November’s election, the 
 
97. U.S. Const., art. II § 1. 
98. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 366. 
99. See id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers envisioned an electoral college of ‘wise men’ 
who would . . . exercise independent and detached judgment as to the best 
person to serve as President.”); Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) (expressing 
belief that “select bodies of electors” will have an advantage over popular 
elections tainted by “the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears 
of the unwary and uninterested”); Federalist No. 68 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (arguing that the choice of an executive should be made by “men 
most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting 
under circumstances favorable to deliberation and to a judicious combination 
of all the reasons and inducements that were proper to govern their choice”). 
See also Ross, supra note 21, at 157 (noting that Madison came to believe 
that winner-take-all was inconsistent with the Framers’ original intent). 
100. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 12. 
101. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 366. 
102. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing how Federalist John 
Adams received the most votes and became president, while Democratic-
Republican Thomas Jefferson was elected vice president). 
103. See id. at 13–14. 
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Twelfth Amendment, providing that electoral votes were to be cast 
separately for president and vice president, had been ratified.104 
The Twelfth Amendment, however, did not change state legis-
latures’ right to choose the manner in which electors are selected, and 
throughout the early 1800s, many legislatures appointed electors on 
their own without popular input.105 Eventually, however, pressures for 
a more democratic process prompted all states to allow direct voting 
for electors, and all but South Carolina had incorporated a democratic 
element by 1832.106 While some states initially provided for voting by 
district, eventually almost all states succumbed to the “competitive 
pressure” provided by winner-take-all, or “general ticket” systems, as 
they were then called.107 Winner-take-all-enabled states could “deliver 
a solid bloc of electors to their party’s national ticket, thereby 
buttressing its claims for patronage and other rewards from the new 
administration.”108 By 1868, all states had adopted a popular-election, 
winner-take-all system, which they have maintained ever since with 
only three exceptions,109 of which just two—district-based voting in 
Maine and Nebraska—persist today.110 
Even as the winner-take-all system was tacitly becoming the norm, 
some criticized it as unfair. In 1824, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton observed that while “los[ing] their votes is the fate of all minor-
ities,” the operation of the unit rule was “not a case of votes lost, but 
of votes taken away, added to those of the majority, and given to a 
 
104. See id. at 14; U.S. Const. amend. XII. 
105. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 15. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id.; see also Longley & Peirce, supra note 11, at 25 (“Generally, division 
of a state’s electoral votes was supported by whatever party was 
momentarily in eclipse in a state, while the dominant party supported a 
winner-take-all arrangement. Not very surprisingly, the latter’s view usually 
prevailed.”). 
109. In addition to the two states—Maine and Nebraska—that currently allocate 
electoral votes by district, Michigan briefly used a district system for the 
election of 1892. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 16; Longley & 
Peirce, supra note 11, at 99. Note, however, that the winner-take-all system 
in its exact current form has been in existence only since the early twentieth 
century, since prior to that time ballots listed electors rather than the names 
of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. See Norman R. 
Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, 
and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 Geo. L.J. 173, 181 (2011). 
110. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing Maine and Nebraska’s 
modified winner-take-all models). 
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person to whom the minority is opposed.”111 Jefferson and Madison op-
posed the winner-take-all general ticket system on similar grounds, 
arguing that, by ignoring the preferences of the minority, it failed to 
accurately mirror public sentiment.112 Madison also argued that a more 
fine-grained system was more consistent with the electoral college’s 
original intent.113 
The election of 1824—in which Andrew Jackson received the most 
votes among the states that did not appoint their electors, rather than 
the prevailing candidate, John Quincy Adams—sparked new concerns 
about the electoral college’s democratic legitimacy, including the 
wisdom of the winner-take-all system.114 In 1826, the House of Repre-
sentatives considered a constitutional amendment that would have 
required states to select electors by districts and eliminated the House’s 
role in resolving elections in which no candidate attained an electoral-
vote majority.115 Proponents of the amendment argued that the winner-
take-all general ticket artificially magnified popular support and might 
mislead the president into misreading the public will.116 Opponents 
believed that the power to choose the manner of appointing electors 
should remain with the states.117 Interestingly, they also argued that a 
district system could create miniature electoral-popular splits on the 
state level; if a candidate won some districts narrowly, he could win the 
majority of a state’s electoral votes even while failing to win that state’s 
popular vote.118 Concerns that issues of this sort would result in an 
overall loss of state influence contributed to the plan’s defeat by a 90-
102 vote.119 
 
111. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 19. 
112. See Ross, supra note 21, at 155–57. Interestingly, however, while preferring 
the district system on principle, Jefferson recognized that a general-ticket 
system might serve a “pragmatic need to unify a state’s electoral vote, 
especially in the states with a Republican majority” in order to avoid 
electoral defeat. Id. at 155. Hamilton similarly supported a general ticket 
system when his party was in power, but as his “party began to dwindle, so 
did his preference for the general ticket system.” Id. 
113. See id. at 157 (explaining Madison’s proposition to “establish[] elector 
selection by districts”). 
114. The election of 1824 is hard to compare to the results of today’s electoral 
vote because many states continued to use legislative selection, rather than 
the popular vote, to appoint electors. See Best, supra note 9, at 25; Ross, 
supra note 21, at 159–60. 
115. Ross, supra note 21, at 160. 
116. Id. at 161. 
117. Id. at 162. 
118. See id. 
119. Id. at 163. 
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Because the only issue in question was whether the state or the 
district was the more appropriate unit to use when awarding electoral 
votes, this debate did not go to the heart of the winner-take-all 
question. No option under consideration would have allowed for electors 
to be awarded on a purely proportional basis—and, indeed, as legis-
lators recognized, the district system would simply replicate on a small-
er scale many of the problems of winner-take-all at the state level.120 
Yet some of the arguments raised by opponents of the general ticket 
scheme remain relevant today. In particular, their concern that winner-
take-all not only distorts but ignores the minority’s wishes continues to 
raise troublesome issues, particularly when a candidate wins by an 
extremely narrow margin a state that is effectively split 50-50. This 
phenomenon has occurred frequently in U.S. history. In 1876, for 
example, Rutherford Hayes won several states by approximately 1,000-
vote margins,121 and other elections from the same era featured similarly 
close races, such as Grover Cleveland’s win in New York by a 1,149 
margin in 1884 and California by 147 in 1892.122 Some recent close 
elections have featured equally narrow wins: John F. Kennedy won 
Hawaii by 115 votes in 1960, for example, and in 2000 all 25 of Florida’s 
electoral votes were awarded to George W. Bush despite his razor-thin 
and disputed plurality of 537 votes.123 
Such results have historically proved troubling not only, as Senator 
Benton suggested, for their symbolic slighting of half a state’s elector-
ate,124 but also for the practical mischief they may cause. The winner-
take-all system played a significant role in all four popular-electoral 
vote split elections in which the system has been fully entrenched—that 
 
120. See id. at 162. 
121. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 607–08 (noting that Hayes won South 
Carolina by 889 votes, Florida by 922 votes, Oregon by 1,050 votes, and 
Nevada by 1,075 votes). 
122. See Leip, supra note 62. 
123. See id. 
124. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
341 
is, the elections of 1876, 1888,125 2000, and 2016.126 This excludes the 
election of 1824, when—under somewhat different rules—John Quincy 
Adams prevailed in the electoral college over Andrew Jackson, who won 
a plurality of the popular votes.127 
In 1876—the first election resulting in a popular-electoral split in 
which the winner-take-all system was securely in place—winner-take-
all played a central role in the chaotic result. Although Samuel Tilden 
prevailed over Rutherford Hayes in the popular vote by 3 percent—a 
healthy margin, though one likely achieved in part by voter intimi-
dation128—the electoral college result hinged on the outcome of close, 
disputed results in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, which 
together accounted for 20 electoral votes.129 Widespread allegations of 
fraud on both sides made it nearly impossible to discern the true win-
ner.130 Nonetheless, a Republican-controlled commission awarded the 
disputed votes to Hayes, permitting him to claim victory by a single 
 
125. Judith Best argues that because of both parties’ “widespread fraud in casting 
and counting the votes,” it is “difficult to assert with any confidence” which 
candidate won the popular vote in 1876 as well. Best, supra note 9, at 25. 
It is notable that, if one accepts Best’s analysis, the past two decades have 
produced two of the three clear instances—in 2000 and 2016—in U.S. history 
in which the popular vote winner has clearly failed to attain the presidency. 
But see Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, Winner Take All: 
Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Reform 
of the Presidential Election Process 39 (1978) (William R. Keech, 
ed.) (noting that the same corruption and voter intimidation that occurred 
in 1876 also took place in subsequent elections, and that if a uniform 
standard were applied, “the victories of Presidents Cleveland and Wilson 
would be suspect”). 
126. See Leip, supra note 62 (illustrating the popular-electoral vote split in the 
2000 and 2016 elections). 
127. There are many reasons to exclude 1824 from discussions of popular electoral 
splits. As Judith Best points out, six states’ electoral votes in that election—
27 percent of the total electoral votes—were determined by legislative 
appointment, so it is impossible to undertake a complete tally of the popular 
vote. See Best, supra note 9, at 25. Further, several states employed a 
district-based system rather than winner-take-all. See Twentieth Century 
Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 37 (“The election of 1824 is not very 
relevant to current issues because only three-quarters of the states actually 
held popular elections.”). 
128. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 33. Because of the rampant fraud 
in the election, however, the true margin between the candidates is 
essentially impossible to reconstruct. Best, supra note 9, at 25. 
129. Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 34. 
130. See id. 
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electoral vote, while Democratic opposition was bought off with a 
“sordid” deal to end Reconstruction.131 
If the fraud and violence that plagued the election of 1876 
illustrated some of the perils of disproportionately rewarding narrow 
victories in close states, the next popular-electoral split resulted from a 
more organic feature of the system: the problem that a candidate’s sup-
port might not be evenly spread across states. In 1888, popular vote 
winner Grover Cleveland suffered by virtue of his “inefficient” wins by 
large margins in the south, while electoral vote winner Benjamin 
Harrison accumulated most of his state wins narrowly.132 Cleveland’s 
average vote percentage in the states he won was 5.5 points higher than 
Harrison’s; Harrison won thirteen of his twenty states by margins of 4 
points or less.133 Although the 1888 election is sometimes cited in 
support of the proposition that the winner-take-all mechanism favors 
candidates with national rather than regional appeal,134 one commen-
tator has argued compellingly that both Cleveland and Harrison had a 
regionally concentrated base of support and that the 1888 regional 
distribution of votes substantially mirrored that of 1880, in which there 
was not a popular-electoral split.135 
More recently, Gore’s electoral loss in 2000 was somewhat anom-
alous in that the popular-electoral split was due as much to the two-
vote bonus as to winner-take-all: Gore would have won had states been 
stripped of their “constant two,”136 while under a proportional split of 
electoral votes he would have come in second by a minuscule margin of 
about one-half an electoral vote in a result that would have been 
 
131. See id. at 34–35 (explaining that Democrats forewent challenging the 
commission’s decision in exchange for the promised withdrawal of the 
remaining federal troops in the South). 
132. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 25. 
133. See id. 
134. See Best, supra note 9, at 65 (discussing 1888 as an example of a “sectionally 
imbalanced candidacy”). 
135. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 501–02 (observing that “[i]ndeed most of 
the post-Civil War elections evidenced a regional pattern” similar to that of 
1880 and 1888). See also Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for 
Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral 
College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 
Geo. L.J. 237, 242–44 (2011) (noting that in general, elections since the 
Civil War have not “been characterized by hodgepodge, noncontiguous 
patchworks of states supporting the winning candidate” but have instead 
involved regionally concentrated support). 
136. Gore won 19 states and the District of Columbia, while Bush won 31 states. 
See Leip, supra note 62 (noting that Bush received 22 more electoral votes 
than Gore from the “constant two,” greater than his four-electoral-vote 
margin of victory). 
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essentially a tie,137 with neither candidate gaining the “majority of the 
whole number of Electors” that the Twelfth Amendment currently 
requires to become president without the involvement of the House of 
Representatives.138 Given the potential resolution of the election by the 
House and the closeness of the vote overall, it is difficult to say with 
any confidence what would have occurred in 2000 had winner-take-all 
not been in place.139 In contrast, the disputed outcome of the election 
and the prolonged legal battle that ensued can be blamed entirely on 
winner-take-all, which magnified the significance of a handful of Florida 
votes.140 
Finally, the 2016 general election was affected by winner-take-all in 
numerous ways. To begin with, Donald Trump owed his electoral win 
not to the two-vote bonus but to winning more electoral vote-rich states 
 
137. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 134–35 (showing that, under a 
proportional approach awarding votes only to candidates surpassing a cutoff 
point, Gore would have received 268.766 electoral votes, while Bush would 
have amassed 269.234 electoral votes). 
138. U.S. Const., amend. XII. Bush, that is, would have received only a 
fractional amount more than 269 votes, meaning that neither candidate 
would have met the required 270 cut-off. 
139. See infra notes 140 and 180. Given the closeness of the popular vote, it is 
quite plausible that the popular vote margin might also have been different—
whether a larger margin for Gore or a winning margin for Bush—had winner-
take-all not been in place and the candidates been free to pursue a strategy 
not focused on swing states. 
140. As with the 1876 result, it is nearly impossible to determine who Florida’s 
“true” winner would have been in the absence of Supreme Court 
intervention; an exhaustive media study of Florida ballots found that, 
although Bush would have prevailed had the recount gone forward under 
the methodology that likely would have been used, a full state recount would 
have awarded the state to Gore. See Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, 
Examining the Vote: The Overview; Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds 
Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-overview-study-
disputed-florida-ballots-finds-justices-did-not.html. [https://perma.cc/3AR 
W-XZ9F]. As the reporters noted, “[t]he race was so close that it is possible 
to get different results simply by applying different hypothetical vote-
counting methods to the thousands of uncounted ballots. And in every case, 
the ballot review produced a result that was even closer than the official 
count—a margin of perhaps four or five thousandths of one percent out of 
about six million ballots cast for president.” In addition, the study found 
“statistical support” for the idea that faulty ballot design had cost Gore 
enough votes to sway the election. Id. See also Dennis Cauchon & Jim 
Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the Election, USA Today (May 
11, 2001), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2001-05-10-reco 
untmain.htm [https://perma.cc/4QH4-HWHT] (discussing evidence that 
voter mistake cost Gore 15,000 to 25,000 votes). 
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by narrow margins.141 More broadly, Trump’s final campaign strategy, 
which relied in large part on sending negative messages to narrowly 
targeted groups of Democratic-leaning voters in key states, was shaped 
by the demands of winner-take-all.142 
As many have observed, numerous other contests only narrowly 
avoided an electoral-popular split.143 Such a division is a significant 
threat whenever the country is closely divided;144 for this reason, as 
Abbott and Levine note, the possibility “hung like a dark cloud over 
every election from 1876 to 1896.”145 The opportunities for a split re-
ceded somewhat throughout most of the twentieth century, when both 
popular and electoral vote landslides became more common.146 Yet in 
the close elections that did occur, a small shift of votes would have 
produced a difference in the electoral and popular winners.147 Further, 
even some elections featuring a decisive popular margin have come 
reasonably close to electing the popular vote loser.148 With the close 
partisan divide that has characterized recent elections and the increased 
focus on battleground states, there is reason to think that the possibility 
of a popular-electoral split, which has occurred in two out of the five 
past elections, has increased.149 
 
141. See Cohn, supra note 48; Lessig, supra note 22. 
142. See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text. 
143. Longley and Braun argue, for example, that, had Alabama’s votes been 
counted a different way—a “perfectly reasonable and possibly even 
preferable method”—Nixon would have won an electoral college plurality in 
1960. Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 35. 
144. See id. at 3 (discussing analysis by Charles Bischoff suggesting that close 
popular vote margins result in as much as a 50-50 chance of a popular-
electoral split). See also Koza et al., supra note 3, at 49 (noting that, as 
of 2012, one in seven non-landslide elections have resulted in a popular-
electoral split). 
145. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 26 (emphasis omitted). 
146. Id. at 28. 
147. See id. (indicating the 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1976 elections as close enough 
to have produced a “wrong-winner”). 
148. Abbott and Levine, for example, were initially motivated to write a book on 
the subject of “wrong winners” after noting that small shifts in state voting 
totals could have thrown the electoral college to Michael Dukakis in 1988 
despite George H.W. Bush’s healthy 8-point popular margin. Id. at xii. 
Indeed, Dukakis’s campaign staff began to pursue such a strategy in the 
campaign’s final days. See id. at 32–33 (“Dukakis strategists believed that 
they had a chance of eking out narrow victories . . .  and, perhaps, pulling 
off an electoral college upset.”). 
149. See infra note 199 (noting the growth in importance of battleground states); 
see also Koza et al., supra note 3, at 129 (“Potential problems with the 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
345 
II. The Distinctive Ill Effects of Winner-Take-All 
As the preceding Part argued, winner-take-all—alone among 
electoral college features that run counter to direct democracy—was 
never adopted with deliberation or with any idea that it represented a 
solution or a compromise;150 further, it has produced widespread prob-
lems throughout U.S history.151 This Part argues that, just as it lacks 
historical legitimacy, the winner-take-all system also lacks contempo-
rary justification. While the electoral college can be reasonably criti-
cized on many grounds, the winner-take-all system stands out for the 
multiplicity of serious problems it has tended to cause, as well as the 
lack of offsetting benefits. The following Part explores these issues, first 
looking at the various difficulties winner-take-all has caused in the 
presidential election process, then considering the similar issues that a 
partial winner-take-all system has posed in Republican nomination 
contests.  
A. Winner-Take-All’s Negative Effects on the Election Process 
All election systems, of course, have costs, benefits, and tradeoffs. 
That no perfect process exists has been apparent in the debates over 
various electoral college reform proposals, from proportional allocation 
of electoral votes to direct election. Nonetheless, the winner-take-all rule 
stands out for the degree to which it produces anomalous results, 
arbitrarily advantages or disadvantages groups of voters, and contrib-
utes to various types of political mischief. 
1. Contributing to Arbitrary Electoral-Popular Splits 
The degree to which the winner-take-all system heightens the risk 
of a popular-electoral split is a significant problem—one that occasioned 
bipartisan concern in the years before the 2000 election. In a prescient 
1991 book,152 David W. Abbott and James P. Levine made what they 
 
current statewide winner-take-all system appear to be becoming increasingly 
common.”). 
150. See supra notes 96–110 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 121–142 and accompanying text. 
152. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6. Although the authors were correct 
about the imminent threat of such a split and many of its particulars—they 
suggested that it might happen as early as 1996, that one of the affected 
candidates might be Al Gore, and that a third-party spoiler candidate might 
play a role—their prediction was imperfect. Id. at 5–6. They argued that, 
because of a perceived Republican electoral college disadvantage, a Democrat 
would be the beneficiary of the split. Id. at 5. Abbott and Levine also failed 
to foresee the widespread acquiescence in the idea of electing a popular vote 
loser in 2000 and 2016; they argued that a president who did not win the 
popular vote would be “politically crippled” and that, following the election 
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called the “ominous prediction” that the popular and electoral vote 
winners would soon diverge, precipitating a “full-fledged constitutional 
crisis.”153 At the time, even many defenders of the electoral college did 
not deny that a popular-electoral split was undesirable; rather, they 
argued that the risk was small and outweighed by positive aspects of 
the current system. For example, Judith Best, writing a defense of the 
electoral college in 1975, conceded that an electoral-popular split would 
be a “misfire”154 in which the “wrong man” would be elected.155 She 
nonetheless argued that this had happened in only a single election in 
U.S. history in 1888, maintaining that given allegations of fraud, the 
true popular-vote winner in the 1876 election was impossible to 
determine.156 She further contended that an 1888-like split was “atypi-
cal” and “unlikely to recur frequently” because it occurs “only when a 
close election coincides with a sectionally imbalanced candidacy or 
campaign.”157 Alexander Bickel, writing in 1971, likewise believed a 
popular-electoral split not to be worth worrying about largely because 
it was “extremely unlikely”158 and maintained that, due to the irregu-
larities of the 1876 election, 1888 was the sole example in which such a 
split had occurred.159 
In the wake of the 2000 election of George W. Bush, despite Al 
Gore’s slim popular vote victory, there was less immediate concern 
about the possibility of popular-electoral splits, perhaps because of the 
closeness of that election made the selection of a winner seem a tossup 
 
of such an executive, “[o]ne of the first orders of business of the new Congress 
. . . would be to begin hearings on proposals for a constitutional amendment 
to abolish the electoral college.” Id. at 46. In terms of prescience, Lawrence 
D. Longley and Neal R. Peirce also deserve credit for their foresight in 
imagining—in their 1996 book—disputed outcomes in future elections that 
would drag on for weeks. See Longley & Peirce, supra note 108, at 154–
56. 
153. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at xi. 
154. Best, supra note 9, at 65. 
155. Id. at 71. 
156. See id. at 25. 
157. Id. at 65–66. 
158. Alexander M. Bickel, Reform and Continuity: The Electoral 
College, the Convention, and the Party System 5 (1971). See also 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 38 
(“Defenders of the Electoral College acknowledge the 1888 deviation but 
emphasize its remoteness . . . [I]t does seem hard to become wrought up over 
the election of Benjamin Harrison, . . . or the denial of Grover Cleveland, 
who after all was elected again in 1892 and got to be president as long as 
anyone except Franklin Roosevelt.”). 
159. See Bickel, supra note 158, at 31. 
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to begin with or because attention was focused on the Supreme Court 
battle over Florida’s recount. Following the 2000 election, Ann 
Althouse, for example, argued that electoral-popular splits were less 
concerning than many earlier commentators had thought: They were, 
she argued, likely to occur only in 2000-like circumstances, “a very close 
race [where] one reasonably strong competitor rather than another 
wins.”160 She argued further that as between two candidates with 
roughly equal proportions of the vote, it is hard to argue that awarding 
victory to either is particularly unfair, contending that in such close 
races “all one really needs is a device to determine an outcome.”161 
Regardless of what one thinks of such efforts to rationalize the 2000 
result, the 2016 election should prompt new reflection about both the 
likely frequency and the legitimacy of popular-electoral splits. It was, 
to begin with, a significantly more exaggerated example of the phenom-
enon. In 2000, Al Gore won a bare half-percent popular victory, and 
George W. Bush eked out a four-vote electoral win.162 By contrast, 
Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by a far more significant 2.1 
percent, while Donald Trump’s electoral win was also considerably more 
decisive.163 The split was also notable because of its momentous 
consequences—in contrast to, say, 1888’s victor Harrison, whose 
“impact on the nation was not great,”164 it is possible that Trump’s 
presidency will profoundly alter the course of U.S. history. Nor can the 
election results—in contrast to what some have argued about 1888 and 
even 2000165—be attributed to one candidate’s narrow regional appeal. 
While Clinton won fewer states than Trump, she won by wide margins 
in states as regionally and culturally diverse as California, New Mexico, 
and Maryland, to name just a few; further, she won several states 
 
160. Althouse, supra note 7, at 1013. 
161. Id. See also Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 
57 (arguing that in close races, the Electoral College can be seen as a 
“dignified, authoritative coin flip”). 
162. Leip, supra note 62. This figure is based on the results originally certified by 
the states. Because of one faithless Gore elector, the margin in the final 
electoral college vote was 271 to 266. Id.; Koza et al., supra note 3, at 115. 
163. See Leip, supra note 62 (showing that Clinton won the popular vote by 2.1 
percent, while Trump won the final electoral vote by a more than 14 percent 
margin). The final tally differs slightly from the expected electoral vote 
because of the seven total defections in the electoral college. See Kyle 
Cheney, Electoral College Sees Record-Breaking Defections, Politico (Dec. 
19, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/electoral-college-electors-
232836 [https://perma.cc/D2M7-LWQC]. 
164. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 38. 
165. Althouse argues, for example, that in 2000 “[b]oth parties . . . risked losing 
by appealing too much to limited geographical areas.” Althouse, supra note 
7, at 1013. 
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located within generally Trump-friendly regions, such as Minnesota in 
the upper Midwest and Colorado among the mountain states.166 Finally, 
2016’s results can be fairly clearly attributed to the effects of winner-
take-all alone, since under the most commonly proposed system of pro-
portional vote allocation, Clinton would have prevailed.167 
Even apart from whatever one thinks of the specific qualities of 
candidates Trump and Clinton, it is difficult to come up with a 
principled reason why our electoral system should favor 2016-like re-
sults as opposed to the more straightforward situation in which the 
popular vote winner is elected president. Trump, that is, did not win 
the electoral college because the popular vote was decided by a razor-
thin margin, nor because Clinton appealed only to one or two regions, 
nor because the small states disproportionately favored him. Rather, he 
won because of the happenstance that his voters happened to be slightly 
more efficiently distributed. 
Of course, some might not see this outcome as happenstance at all, 
arguing instead that Trump’s electoral win was attributable to superior 
campaign strategy. Electoral college defenders have frequently sug-
gested that candidates and parties can mitigate the risk of an electoral-
popular split by wise campaigning,168 and Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
was heavily criticized for devoting insufficient resources to the upper 
Midwest states she lost narrowly.169 Yet some academic research 
 
166. See Leip, supra note 62. 
167. See Lessig, supra note 22 (ruling out the two-vote bonus as the cause of 
Trump’s victory). By contrast, even if all electors had voted for their 
expected candidates and the two-vote bonus had been excluded, Clinton 
would not have won a majority of the remaining electoral votes. Clinton won 
twenty states, plus the District of Columbia, while Trump won thirty, 
leading to the initial electoral tally, disregarding faithless electors,  of 306 to 
232. Leip, supra note 62. Excluding bonus votes, Trump would thus have 
won 246 electoral votes, while Clinton would have won 190. 
168. See Best, supra note 9, at 66 (suggesting that the “wit and ingenuity of the 
political parties” will prevent a popular-electoral split); Althouse, supra note 
7, at 1012 (arguing that “the decision to campaign efficiently under the 
requirements of the electoral college plan” can prevent an electoral-popular 
split). 
169. See, e.g., Edward-Isaac Dovere, How Clinton Lost Michigan—And Blew the 
Election, Politico (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2016/12/michigan-hillary-clinton-trump-232547 [https://perma.cc/3EYL-
ZP8V] (indicating “state battleground operatives worry that [the] lesson being 
missed is . . . [g]et the basics of campaigning right”). However, this criticism 
has been  disputed by others. See Ronald Brownstein, How the Rustbelt Paved 
Trump’s Road to Victory, Atlantic (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trumps-road-to-victory/507203/ 
[https://perma.cc/RW7K-4RQK] (noting that Clinton suffered a narrow loss 
in Pennsylvania despite devoting “enormous resources” to the state, suggesting 
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suggests that campaign tactics matter less to presidential outcomes 
than background factors such as consumer sentiment and fixed candi-
date attributes such as incumbency and partisan affiliation.170 If this 
view is correct, the partisan and demographic distribution of voters 
among states—a largely fortuitous circumstance—may matter more to 
the electoral college results than decisions about how and where to 
campaign. Even if one believes that shrewd campaigning can mitigate 
the risk of an electoral-popular split, it is hard to see why it is desirable 
for an electoral system to require candidates to focus on gaining narrow 
tactical advantages, a skill that bears little relation to governing and 
that, presumably, often comes at the expense of addressing the concerns 
of the electorate as a whole. The tactical emphasis the electoral college 
encourages is particularly problematic because, as the next Section de-
scribes, candidates may seek to gain an electoral college boost through 
such undesirable measures as suppressing or discouraging votes. 
Thus, 2016 suggests that the popular-electoral split scenario 
remains a meaningful problem for the winner-take-all system—one that 
may occur more frequently, more arbitrarily, with more jarring popular-
electoral disparities, and with more momentous consequences than has 
been thought possible in the past. 
2. Incentives for Fraud and Voter Suppression 
The pernicious effects of winner-take-all, however, go well beyond 
its potential to produce anomalous overall results. It has long been ob-
served that winner-take-all creates little incentive on the part of 
campaigns to increase voter participation in states that are reliably red 
or blue,171 a reality that may account for the dramatically lower turnout 
in non-battleground versus battleground states.172 Perhaps even more 
importantly, however, winner-take-all provides a powerful incentive for 
campaigns to commit fraud in close states. 173 This was certainly true in 
 
that lack of campaign resources alone did not account for the electoral 
outcome). 
170. See The Electoral Challenge: Theory Meets Practice ix (Stephen 
C. Craig & David B. Hill, eds., 2011) (“Do campaigns really matter? A good 
bit of academic literature suggests that they do not—or at least not as much 
as politicians and the media tend to think they do.”) 
171. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 84. 
172. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 37 (noting battleground states had an 11 
percent higher voter turnout rate than the national average). 
173. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 19 (explaining that winner-take-
all “plac[es] a premium on fraud and accident”); Abbott & Levine, supra 
note 6, at 136 (arguing that direct election would decrease fraud because “it 
would eliminate the situation where large blocs of electoral votes hinged on 
how just a few popular votes were distributed”); Althouse, supra note 7, at 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
350 
the 1876 election, where “[i]n the casting, counting, and canvassing of 
votes there was every conceivable violation of the election laws,”174 in-
cluding “riots, assassinations, murders, [and] midnight raids.”175 While 
abuses were bipartisan and likely had a greater effect on depressing 
Hayes votes than Tilden votes,176 they surely cast doubt on the final 
electoral college results, in which Hayes won four crucial states by less 
than 1100 votes.177 
One would hope that today’s election process is characterized by a 
greater degree of integrity. Yet some commentators have raised 
concerns about the potential for smaller-scale fraud today, noting the 
vulnerability of voting systems to tampering and the difficulty of au-
diting close races in some states.178 The disproportionate influence of 
particular groups in swing states makes elections more vulnerable to 
outside interference; in 2016, for example, Russian trolls may have 
targeted swing-state voters with false anti-Clinton news stories.179 
Winner-take-all also magnifies the possibility that chance occurrences, 
such as bad weather in a reliably Democratic or Republican part of the 
state or confusing ballot design in one county, may tip the results arbi-
trarily into one column or the other.180 
 
998 (“The unit rule magnifies the effect of fraud, and, consequently, 
heightens the temptation to engage in it.”). 
174. Best, supra note 9, at 53. 
175. Id. at 52. 
176. Id. at 52–53. 
177. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 126. 
178. See Zeynep Tufekci, The Election Won’t Be Rigged. But It Could Be Hacked., 
N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/ 
opinion/campaign-stops/the-election-wont-be-rigged-but-it-could-be-hacked. 
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9X2R-WVYX]. 
179. See Julian Borger, Investigators Explore If Russia Colluded with Pro-Trump 
Sites During US Election, Guardian (July 5, 2017), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/05/donald-trump-russia-investigation-
fake-news-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/3SF6-52ST]. 
180. A notable example of such a fortuitous occurrence was the use of the so-
called “butterfly ballot” in Democratic-leaning Palm Beach County, Florida 
in 2000, widely believed to have confused voters into accidentally spoiling 
their ballot by double-voting. The number of votes that may have been 
affected substantially exceeded George W. Bush’s eventual margin of victory 
in the state. See Fessenden, supra note 140 (noting that up to 5,310 Gore 
voters versus only 2,600 Bush voters may have accidentally spoiled their 
ballot in Palm Beach County). Similar problems disproportionately affected 
Gore voters in other parts of the state. See id. (noting similar problems in 
Duval County, Florida). See also Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political 
Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
351 
Further, even where outright fraud does not occur, winner-take-all 
creates incentives to depress the votes of groups with a strong partisan 
affiliation—such as African-Americans181 or students182—that might 
otherwise provide one’s opponent’s margin of victory. In 2016, for 
example, critics charged that Republicans in swing-state North Caro-
lina passed restrictive voting legislation with the intent of making it 
more difficult for the overwhelmingly Democratic-leaning African-
American community to vote.183 The Fourth Circuit ultimately struck 
down the new state rules, but some county election boards continued 
to limit the availability of polling places and restrict early voting 
hours.184 While it is not entirely clear that such tactics are effective in 
reducing turnout,185 their use, as well as the clear incentive that winner-
take-all provides to engage in them, is nonetheless troubling. 
Winner-take-all may also be giving rise to new campaign strategies 
that focus on discouraging voters rather than motivating them. In 2016, 
a Trump campaign digital operation called Project Alamo barraged nar-
rowly targeted groups of potential Clinton voters in swing states such 
as Florida with negative messages in order to discourage them from 
voting. 186 A Trump campaign official boasted at the time that “[we] 
 
Persp. on Pol. 571, 577 (2012) (summarizing research that “uncontrollable 
events can have large effects” on election results). 
181. See Vann R. Newkirk II, What Early Voting in North Carolina Actually 
Reveals, Atlantic (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2016/11/north-carolina-early-voting/506963/ [https://perma.cc/SB 
R3-VLQ7]. The Fourth Circuit struck down provisions of North Carolina 
voting legislation that “restricted voting and registration in five different 
ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans.” See N.C. 
State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 
2016). The court noted that “[v]oting in many areas of North Carolina is 
racially polarized,” which left “minority voters uniquely vulnerable to the 
inevitable tendency of elected officials to entrench themselves by targeting 
groups unlikely to vote for them.” Id. The measures in question, the court 
found, “target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision.” Id. 
182. See Elizabeth Campbell, Voting Hurdles Often Keep College Students Away 
from the Ballot Box, NBC News (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.nbcnews. 
com/feature/college-game-plan/voting-hurdles-often-keep-college-students-
away-ballot-box-n637046 [https://perma.cc/68WD-MCWH] (discussing, 
among other things, claims by a public policy professor that North Carolina 
enacted more stringent requirements for students in order to dampen the 
Democratic-leaning youth vote). 
183. See Newkirk, supra note 181; see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214. 
184. See Newkirk, supra note 181. 
185. See id. (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between new voting laws and 
historical disenfranchisement as the cause of low voter turnout). 
186. See Joshua Green & Sasha Issenberg, Inside the Trump Bunker, with Days 
to Go, Bloomberg Businessweek (Oct. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www. 
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have three major voter suppression operations under way.”187 Messages 
were sent as so-called “dark posts”—nonpublic posts visible on 
Facebook only to those the campaign had selected—thus discouraging 
fact-checking or open dialogue.188 The tactic may have been a successful 
one, given that Trump won many of the targeted states by narrow 
margins.189 Nonetheless, rewarding this type of campaigning, as the 
winner-take-all system does, would seem to have few societal benefits. 
Indeed, following the 2016 election, commentators expressed concern 
about the use of Facebook to spread misleading or highly partisan 
information, cautioning that it might have the effect of increasing polit-
ical polarization.190 
The winner-take-all system thus creates troublesome incentives for 
candidates and parties. In extreme cases, the drive to eke out narrow 
victories has led to the sort of fraud and intimidation that occurred in 
1876. But even less drastic tactics for depressing votes for one’s oppo-
nent, such as reducing available polling places or providing voters with 
targeted negative content, have the potential to increase partisanship 
and lower civic engagement. 
3. Arbitrarily Distributing Power to Certain Voter Groups 
As the previous Section suggests, far from forcing candidates to 
campaign broadly, winner-takes-all rewards a campaign strategy that 
narrowly targets voters sufficient to form a majority in key states. 
Under a winner-take-all scheme, “a candidate can win an election by 
targeting only 25 percent of the national electorate—50 percent of the 
voters in states with 50 percent of the electoral votes.”191 This risk is 
not merely theoretical; in every recent election, candidates have over-
whelmingly concentrated resources in a handful of states. In 2012, for 
example, President Obama made post-convention campaign visits to 
only eight states, while Mitt Romney in the post-nomination period 
 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/inside-the-trump-bunker-with-12-
days-to-go [https://perma.cc/SR2C-8K8X]. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. (explaining Trump’s target states of Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
North Carolina, and Georgia); see also Leip, supra note 62 (indicating 
Trump’s margin of victory in those states). 
190. See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Facebook’s Failure: Did Fake News and Polarized 
Politics Get Trump Elected?, Guardian (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:59 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/10/facebook-fake-news-
election-conspiracy-theories [https://perma.cc/NPB4-D6C2]. 
191. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial 
Congress, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1217, 1234 (2006). 
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campaigned in only ten.192 In thirty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia, neither candidate—and, for that matter, neither vice-
presidential candidate—conducted a post-convention event.193 Non-
battleground states faced a similar dearth of campaign advertising194 
and media coverage, including polling.195 
This concentration of political attention sends a clear message to 
voters in the majority of states of their irrelevance, and it is perhaps 
unsurprising that turnout in the small minority of swing states signif-
icantly exceeds turnout in the rest of the country.196 At the same time, 
the intensity of the campaign may be more an annoyance than a boon 
to residents of contested states; every presidential election seems to 
feature news stories about people like the Pennsylvania resident inter-
viewed in 2016, who reported that he disliked the nastiness of the 
campaign and had turned to Netflix to escape incessant political 
commercials.197 Yet battleground state residents also enjoy material 
advantages; some research has found that swing states receive more 
responsive disaster relief and additional federal grant dollars relative to 
states dominated by one party.198 
Troublingly, there is some evidence that the number of swing states 
is shrinking, thus making the states in which the campaign is truly 
contested even more unrepresentative of the general U.S. population. 
The term “swing state” was not even in common use before the 1950s199 
 
192. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 33. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 12–32 (describing the concentration of campaign advertising and 
other resources in a few states during the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections). 
195. See id. at 33. 
196. In 2012, for example, turnout was 67 percent in battleground states and 59.4 
percent in the nation on average. Id. at 37. In 2016, preliminary results 
suggested that turnout was similarly 65.3 percent in swing states and 56.3 
in other states. Carl Bialik, Voter Turnout Fell, Especially in States That 
Clinton Won, FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 11, 2016, 6:22 PM), https:// 
fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-turnout-fell-especially-in-states-that-
clinton-won/ [https://perma.cc/4L39-Y9ZY]. These preliminary figures 
slightly understate overall 2016 turnout but nonetheless show a clear pattern. 
See id. 
197. Emma Green, Pennsylvania Is Ready to Stop Being a Full-Time Swing 
State, Atlantic (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2016/11/swing-state-pennsylvania-cant-wait-till-this-is-over/506909/ 
[https://perma.cc/EBL9-Q3G2]. 
198. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 43–47 (summarizing research showing 
that highly-competitive states can expect to receive twice as many disaster 
declarations—triggering federal aid—than other states). 
199. Lauren Leatherby & Rich Harris, Swing States: How Changes in the 
Political Landscape Benefit Trump, Guardian (Aug. 28, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
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—its use tripled between 2000 and 2008200—and state allegiances shifted 
more freely in the past, making it less obvious which states would be in 
play. In the four elections between 1984 and 1996, for example, only 
seventeen states consistently voted for the same party; by contrast, in 
the four elections from 2000 to 2012, forty states did so.201 This trend 
means that winner-take-all is likely to result in the targeting of an ever-
narrowing pool of states and voters. 
Winner-take-all does not only cause different states to be treated 
differently; it also results in disparate outcomes for groups of voters 
within a particular state. Winner-take-all has the effect of essentially 
rendering irrelevant both the excess majority votes of a candidate who 
carries a state by a wide margin and the votes for the runner-up 
candidate even if he or she has only fallen short by a handful of votes. 
While this effect as a whole has been criticized for lessening the impact 
of a variety of voters’ preferences,202 some have argued that it has a 
particularly severe effect on members of racial or other minority groups. 
Matthew M. Hoffman, for example, has argued that “so long as minority 
voters have different political preferences than the majority—a fact that 
is almost self-evident in many parts of the country—their votes will be 
virtually meaningless in the final selection of the President.”203 This 
phenomenon, Hoffman argues, is of particular concern in the South, 
where the minority African-American population has consistently 
different presidential preferences from the majority white population 
that are never reflected in the allocation of electoral votes.204 Likewise, 
it has been argued that in predominantly urban states, the preferences 
of less-numerous rural voters are similarly shut out of the process 
through the operation of winner-takes-all.205 
Finally, winner-takes-all confers immense power on an entirely 
arbitrary group of voters: swing voters in battleground states. There 
are of course various ways of assessing the power of a vote, and in for-
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203. Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution 
and the Electoral College, 105 Yale L.J. 935, 936 (1996). 
204. See id. at 936–37. This outcome presents uncomfortable historical parallels 
to southern states’ efforts to count disenfranchised slaves, and later 
freedmen, for purposes of representation while denying them the vote. See 
supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text. 
205. Debra Lyn Basset, The Politics of the Rural Vote, 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 743, 
784 (2003). 
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mal terms, these voters do not have any special status in contrast to, 
for example, the voters of Wyoming, who control more than three times 
more electoral votes per person than the voters of California.206 In prac-
tical terms, however, what is likely to matter to an individual voter is 
the chance that her vote will affect the ultimate national outcome—an 
analysis under which Wyoming residents are severely disadvantaged. A 
famous 1968 analysis by John F. Banzhaf III,207 which had considerable 
influence on the then-active congressional efforts at electoral college re-
form,208 emphasized the greater voting power of large-state residents, 
given their influence over a larger bloc of votes.209 As he concluded, “a 
voter in New York State has 3.312 times the voting power of a citizen 
in another part of the country.”210 Banzhaf, however, considered only 
the voting power inherent in a winner-take-all system; as he acknowl-
edged, a voter’s “actual ability to affect the outcome of any particular 
election” would depend on contingent factors such as “the political 
impotence of a Republican in a solidly Democratic state.”211 More 
recently, Andrew Gelman has modeled the chance that a single vote 
will determine the outcome while taking into account some such real-
world factors, including state-by-state polling data.212 In an analysis 
published just prior to the 2016 election, he concluded that voting 
power would be greatest—approximately one in one million probability 
of an individual vote affecting the result—in New Hampshire and 
Colorado, and orders of magnitude lower in both California, with a one 
in seven billion chance, and Wyoming, with a one in thirty billion 
chance.213 To put it another way, a New Hampshire resident has 30,000 
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Work: An Empirical Analysis, 34 British J. Pol. Sci. 657, 657 (2004). 
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Difference?, 50 Econ. Inquiry 321, 322 (2012). 
213. See Andrew Gelman, What Are the Chances Your Vote Matters?, Slate 
(Nov. 7, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
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times more power over the result than a citizen of Wyoming, making 
campaign efforts to sway the New Hampshire voter considerably more 
valuable.214 Even if imperfect polling data renders these figures necessar-
ily imprecise, they nonetheless illustrate the scale of the disparities. 
Such disparities would be troubling on fairness grounds even if there 
were some reason to believe that swing voters in New Hampshire were 
likely to exercise better judgment than reliably Republican or Demo-
cratic voters in “safe” states like Wyoming and California. In fact, 
however, abundant research suggests that many swing voters are 
politically naïve and uninformed and that low-information voters are 
more likely to be undecided between candidates.215 Thus, the dispro-
portionate influence of these voters, it can be argued, lacks logic as well 
as fairness. 
4. Distortions of the Meaning of an Election 
As some commentators have argued, another troubling feature       
of the winner-take-all system is its potential to create “false man-
dates”216—electoral-vote results that suggest a more decisive win than 
is reflected in the popular vote.217 This effect may convert a decisive 
but hardly overwhelming popular-vote margin, such as George H.W. 
Bush’s in 1988, into an electoral college blowout,218 or grant a 43 percent 
plurality winner, such as Bill Clinton in 1992, a decisive electoral 
margin of 370-168, or 69 to 31 percent.219 This effect occurs within 
 
Gelman, What Is the Chance That Your Vote Will Decide the Election?, 
https://pkremp.github.io/pr_decisive_vote.html [https://perma.cc/66AR 
-M2SF]. 
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216. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 5. 
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percent of the electoral votes). 
219. See Leip, supra note 62. 
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individual states as well: winner-take-all not only enables one candidate 
to amass all a state’s electoral votes with a minuscule margin of victory, 
such as George W. Bush’s 537-vote Florida win in 2000,220 but also 
makes it possible for one candidate to win a state with “breath-
taking[ly]” low pluralities, such as George H.W. Bush’s attainment of 
Arizona’s eight electoral votes in 1992 with only a 38.5 percent 
plurality.221 
This tendency is sometimes cited as a positive feature by the 
electoral college’s defenders, who argue that the appearance of a man-
date enhances the victor’s legitimacy and thus permits narrow winners 
more scope to govern effectively.222 Yet it is far from clear that creating 
a disconnect between the realities of popular sentiment and the message 
conveyed by the electoral college totals is always, or even frequently, 
an affirmative good. Negative effects are also possible: The magnifi-
cation of the president’s victory, for example, may cause him to misread 
the will of the electorate and support unpopular or even autocratic 
policies.223 The creation of a false mandate may contribute to a bitter 
political climate, making defeat harder on the losers.224 Further, there 
is no guarantee that the electoral losers will accept the alleged mandate-
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conferring magic of the electoral college. Following the 1992 election, 
for example, Republicans railed against Bill Clinton as a plurality presi-
dent who had won just 43 percent of the vote, notwithstanding his 
decisive electoral majority.225 Far from rallying public support around 
the winner, the magnification effect of the electoral college may, on the 
contrary, increase partisan tensions by emboldening winners while mak-
ing losers feel unrepresented or ignored. 
5. Third-Party Mischief and Spoiler Effects 
Some commentators have argued that winner-take-all strengthens 
the two-party system because it is difficult for a more peripheral candi-
date, even if he or she has some support, to attain a plurality in any 
one state.226 Even if this were true—and it is an obstacle that, at least 
historically, some third-party candidates have overcome—third-party 
candidates and their supporters have the potential both to cause great 
trouble under a winner-take-all system and to be arbitrarily disadvan-
taged by it. 
While it has proven essentially impossible for a candidate not from 
a major party to win a presidential election and difficult for such a 
candidate to win a state, such candidates can easily serve as spoilers, 
drawing enough votes from one candidate to deliver a state to anoth-
er.227 This gives third-party partisans in swing states influence over 
major-party candidates and their positions that may be entirely un-
warranted by their modest numbers. It also forces third-party voters, 
at least in closely contested states, to think strategically when they 
vote: should they vote for their preferred candidate, perhaps allowing 
their least favored candidate to win, or should they vote for the “lesser 
of two evils” among the major-party candidates? Support for alterna-
tive voting systems, such as instant runoff, among third-party enthu-
siasts strongly suggests that this is a choice that voters would prefer 
not to have to make,228 and it is one they would generally not be re-
 
225. Andrés Martinez, Americans Have Seen the Last Four Presidents as 
Illegitimate. Here’s Why., Wash. Post (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/20/americans-have-seen-
the-last-four-presidents-as-illegitimate-heres-why/?utm_term=.1532bf59ccf4 
[https://perma.cc/3KH9-K4US]. 
226. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 7, at 1005 (“Although the electoral college 
does not eliminate third parties, it suppresses them.”). 
227. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 110–11 (discussing the candidacy 
of John Anderson as an example of this phenomenon). The third-party 
spoiler phenomenon has only come into greater focus in the succeeding years. 
228. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested 
History of Democracy in the United States 437 n.16 (rev. ed. 2009) 
(noting that instant runoff would avoid forcing third-party voters to confront 
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quired to make in a direct election or proportional allocation system, in 
which their third-party preferences would be far less consequential. 
Historically, winner-take-all has also provided more sinister oppor-
tunities for election gamesmanship by third parties. Throughout the 
civil rights era, segregationist third parties with strong regional support 
repeatedly attempted to use the electoral college to increase their pow-
er; their plan was to accrue enough electoral votes to be necessary for 
electoral college victory and to force concessions from the majority vote 
winner in return for their support.229 Although this scheme was never 
fully successful, it likely succeeded in making some national-party can-
didates more receptive to segregationists’ concerns.230 Further, there is 
no guarantee that a similar scenario will not resurface in the future. For 
example, former CIA officer Evan McMullin, running as a conservative 
alternative to Donald Trump in 2016, concentrated his campaign in 
Utah, in part with the hope of depriving both major-party candidates 
of an electoral college majority and throwing the election into the House 
of Representatives.231 Although McMullin did not succeed in winning 
the state—and the results of the election would not have changed even 
if he had—he ran only a few points behind second-place candidate 
Hillary Clinton,232 and might have done still better had his national 
profile been higher to begin with. As it was, McMullin’s share of the 
vote in Utah was approximately 40 times his national vote percent-
age,233 thus illustrating the potential for a third-party candidate to find 
disproportionate favor in a single state or region. 
Thus, far from discouraging third parties entirely, the electoral 
college provides opportunities for third-party supporters to exercise 
leverage disproportionate to their numbers and for third-party candi-
 
“the classic dilemma of having to choose between ‘wasting their votes’ or 
voting for the ‘lesser of two evils’”). 
229. See Hoffman, supra note 203, at 950–62; see also Longley & Peirce, supra 
note 108, at 64 (discussing how the winner-take-all system magnified George 
Wallace’s influence by his “ability to draw off votes from one of the two 
major parties and possibly tilt a large state’s bloc of . . . electoral votes”); 
Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that the unit rule “favors 
third parties with a sectional orientation, and . . . discriminates against those 
with a national orientation”). 
230. See Hoffman, supra note 203, at 957 (noting that Nixon “would take to 
heart” the relative success of segregationist candidate Harry F. Byrd in 1960 
when crafting his strategy in 1968). 
231. See Melanie Mason, Evan McMullin Made Utah a Presidential Battleground. 
Next, He’ll Try To Transform Conservative Politics, L.A. Times (Oct. 27, 
2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-evan-mcmullin-
utah-20161027-story.html [https://perma.cc/6UFW-8QQN]. 
232. See Leip, supra note 62. 
233. See id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
360 
dates to run up votes in one state or region in order to maximize their 
influence in the electoral college. Further, both effects are highly 
problematic. As is true with other voter groups, the influence of third-
party voters is arbitrarily distributed; Green Party supporters in swing-
state Florida have tremendous leverage while libertarians in safely 
Democratic California have none. Similarly, it is hard to see what is to 
be gained from the phenomenon of third-party kingmakers who use 
regional support either to undermine or to pressure major-party candi-
dates; such a scenario at best invites chaos and at worst allows the sort 
of mischief in which George Wallace and other segregationist candidates 
attempted to engage.234 It is questionable, therefore, whether winner-
take-all does much to shore up the two-party system relative to alter-
natives that also include measures that make it more difficult for third 
parties to gain support.235 Even if winner-take-all helps the major par-
ties to some degree, this effect must be weighed against the potential 
third-party gamesmanship it may allow. 
B. The Experience of Winner-Take-All in Party Nominations 
The preceding section has argued that the winner-take-all system 
has introduced a variety of pernicious effects into U.S. presidential elec-
tions. Interestingly, winner-take-all has also been used in another aspect 
of U.S. politics: the system of delegate allocation used in the process of 
selecting party nominees. It is notable that, in that context, the rule 
has come in for substantial criticism. Indeed, beliefs that the “unit rule” 
was an undemocratic mechanism led the Democratic Party to forbid 
the use of winner-take-all delegate contests in 1968.236 While Republican 
Party continues to allow some states to hold winner-take-all contests, 
it has restricted them to some degree, and many observers argued that 
the continuing use of winner-take-all primaries had negative effects in 
the selection process for the 2016 Republican nominee.237 
1. Winner-Take-All in the Evolution of Modern Primaries 
While the first presidential nomination primaries date from the 
early twentieth century, the idea that party nominees should be chosen 
democratically rather than by party insiders did not really take hold 
until after the controversial Democratic nomination process of 1968.238 
 
234. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
235. Direct election, for example, could include a runoff mechanism, while a 
fractional proportional approach could discourage third-party candidates by 
setting a threshold percentage for receiving electoral votes. 
236. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
237. See infra notes 251–261 and accompanying text. 
238. See Lonna Rae Atkeson & Cherie D. Maestas, Meaningful Participation and 
the Evolution of the Reformed Presidential Nominating System, 42 PS: Pol. 
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Under the ensuing reforms—which began with the Democrats, but soon 
took hold in the Republican Party as well239—states increasingly began 
binding delegates to vote for the winner of popular primaries, with cau-
cuses assuming a secondary role.240 
As part of the reform process, the Democratic Party moved early 
to forbid the use of winner-take-all contests. At the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention, delegates—with the support of nominee 
Humphrey—voted to abolish the “unit rule,”241 and subsequent reforms 
forbade the use of winner-take-all in the nominating process.242 The 
move to proportional representation was part of the general democrat-
izing trend, under which delegate allocation would be linked more 
directly to popular support in the states,243 and was founded on the 
belief that winner-take-all allocation did not accurately reflect the 
voters’ choices244 and stifled the influence of minority and youth voters 
in particular.245 
Currently, the Democratic Party employs a rule under which pop-
ularly chosen delegates are allocated proportionately to candidates who 
 
Sci. &  Pol. 59, 59 (2009) (“The disastrous 1968 convention spawned a 
cascade of reforms in the presidential nomination system, many of which 
were intended to create greater opportunity for meaningful participation of 
the party’s rank-and-file members.”); see also Marty Cohen et al., The 
Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After 
Reform 1–2 (2008) (noting that nominee Hubert Humphrey “did not 
contest a single primary” and that outrage over his nomination sparked 
reform efforts). 
239. See Cohen et al., supra note 238, at 2. 
240. See Zachary M. Bluestone, Note, The Unscripted Evolution of Presidential 
Nominations: From Founding-Era Idealism to the Dominance of Party 
Primaries, 39 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 963, 988 (2016) (discussing how as 
a result of new incentives to hold primaries rather than caucuses, “[i]n 1968, 
sixteen states held primaries, but that number was up to thirty by 1976”). 
241. See id. at 985. 
242. See C.F.W., One Man-One Vote in the Selection of Presidential Nominating 
Delegates by State Party Conventions, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev. 349, 362 n.72 
(1971). 
243. See Atkeson & Maestas, supra note 238, at 59. 
244. See Robert E. DiClerico & James W. Davis, Choosing Our Choices: 
Debating the Presidential Nominating Process 10 (2000) (noting 
that the McGovern-Frasier Commission, which was tasked with making 
reform recommendations in the wake of the 1968 nomination furor, believed 
that the unit rule “prevented a fair reflection of voter preferences”). 
245. See Jeffrey L. Pressman & Denis G. Sullivan, Convention Reform and 
Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment of Democratic Party 
Reforms, 89 Pol. Sci. Q. 539, 539–40 (1974). 
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pass a 15 percent popular vote threshold.246 An additional number of 
“superdelegates” have historically been chosen from the ranks of party 
officials and have not been pledged to any particular candidate, permit-
ting them to vote their own preferences instead.247 This practice will 
change in 2020, when the majority of superdelegates will be bound to 
primary and caucus results.248 While some rounding necessarily occurs 
in the delegate allocation process,249 it should be noted that the 
Democratic Party makes use of several times more delegates than there 
are electors,250 thus allowing the allocation of delegates to mirror the 
popular vote percentage somewhat more precisely. 
By contrast, the Republican Party, even as it adopted most of the 
same reforms as the Democratic Party, decided to retain winner-take-
all contests in many states,251 reflecting a longstanding Republican view 
that the nominating process should be “designed to build consensus 
behind a candidate who wins and keeps winning.”252 The current system 
features a mix of proportional, winner-take-all, and modified winner-
 
246. Joshua T. Putnam, Rules Changes and the 2016 Presidential Nominations, 
53 Soc’y 493, 494 (2016). 
247. See James A. Barnes & Jerrick Adams, 2016 Presidential Nominations: 
Calendar and Delegate Rules, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/2016_ 
presidential_nominations:_calendar_and_delegate_rules [https://perma. 
cc/FML6-HETK]. 
248. See David Weigel, Democrats Vote to Bind Most Superdelegates to State 
Primary Results, Wash. Post (July 23, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/07/23/democrats-vote-to-
bind-most-superdelegates-to-state-primary-results/?utm_term=.5bc21aa64 
403 [https://perma.cc/LDV7-7HE4] (noting that “roughly two-thirds” of 
superdelegates will be restricted). 
249. See Democratic National Committee, Call For the 2016 Democratic 
National Convention 1, 1 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://demrulz.org/wp-content/ 
files/12.15.14_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing__Rules_C
all_Regs_Model_Plan_Checklist_12.15.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LNU-
GN2R]. 
250. The delegate pool each state is allotted is determined according to a 
complicated formula that takes into account both population, as reflected in 
the state’s electoral votes, and past support for Democratic candidates, 
among other factors. See id. at 1–3. California, for example, had 475 pledged 
delegates and 75 superdelegates, for a total of 550—ten times more than its 
electoral vote total of 55. See Ballotpedia, Democratic National 
Convention, 2016, https://ballotpedia.org/Democratic_National_Conven 
tion,_2016 [https://perma.cc/8BZ4-KR2M] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
251. See Thomas R. Marshall, Caucuses and Primaries: Measuring Reform in the 
Presidential Nomination Process, 7 Am. Pol. Q. 155, 164 (1979). 
252. Putnam, supra note 246, at 496. 
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take-all contests;253 states that opt to hold earlier contests are generally 
required to incorporate an element of proportionality, although they 
can award at-large or bonus delegates on a winner-take-all basis, while 
states that wait until the “proportionality window” has passed can allo-
cate delegates in any way they choose.254 
Prior to the 2016 election, the Republican National Committee—
believing that a prolonged nomination struggle had weakened Mitt 
Romney’s candidacy in 2012—shortened the window in which states 
were required to hold proportional contests in an effort to speed up the 
process.255 This use of winner-take-all, like other features of the 
Republican nominating process, was thus intended to minimize 
intraparty friction by creating an early frontrunner, one who presum-
ably would be the choice of the party establishment, and maximizing 
that person’s early lead, reducing the prospects of challengers and 
discouraging them from continuing in the race.256 
This rationale for winner-take-all, however, backfired spectacularly 
in 2016, when Donald Trump was able to translate plurality wins in 
winner-take-all contests into huge delegate gains despite the opposition 
of the Republican Party establishment as well as, in many cases, a 
majority of Republican primary voters. In Florida, for example, can-
didate Trump won all ninety-nine of the state’s delegates despite 
 
253. See Michael T. Morley, Reforming the Contested Convention: Rethinking the 
Presidential Nomination Process, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1085 (2016) 
(describing Republican mix of methods including winner-take-all, 
proportional, and systems in which “a candidate who wins more than a 
certain percentage of the statewide vote (typically, a majority) receives all of 
that state’s delegates; if no candidate reaches that threshold, delegates are 
awarded proportionally”). Some states also use a mix of district-based 
allocation plus an award of statewide delegates to the primary winner. See id. 
254. See Josh Putnam, Everything You Need to Know About How the Presidential 
Primary Works, Wash. Post (May 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/12/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-how-the-presidential-primary-works/ [https://perma.cc/WP3P-C7Q3]. 
255. Id. The proportionality window was shortened to just two weeks. Putnam 
notes, however, that even as the Republican party diminished the 
importance of proportional contests, it also imposed stricter requirements for 
what constitutes a proportional primary. Id. 
256. See Travis Rideout et al., Following the Rules? Candidate Strategy in 
Presidential Primaries, 90 Soc. Sci. Q. 777, 778 (2009) (suggesting that a 
mostly proportional system, like that used by the Democratic Party, is likely 
to result in a “more protracted race to nomination,” as it did in 2008, while 
the greater Republican reliance on winner-take-all produces an earlier 
frontrunner); see also Joshua T. Putnam, The Impact of Rule Changes on 
the 2012 Republican Presidential Primary Process, 49 Soc’y 400, 403 (2012) 
(suggesting that a switch to more proportionality tends to result in a slower 
process of delegate accumulation). 
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garnering only 45.7 percent of the vote.257 Shortly before the Florida 
primary, a Trump adviser described such winner-take-all contests as 
the “rocket fuel” that would propel the candidate to unstoppable vic-
tory.258 This proved to be an accurate view of how the vote played out 
in practice; through success in winner-take-all states, Trump was able 
to amass a significantly larger percentage of the delegate count than 
the popular vote.259 Observers noted that Trump would have likely 
failed to attain a majority of pledged delegates under Democratic Party 
primary rules,260 and that the post-2012 changes to the Republican 
process designed to further advantage the front-runner had helped to 
“advance[] that air of inevitability forming around Donald Trump.”261 
 
257. Florida Primary Results, N.Y. Times (Sept. 29, 2016, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/primaries/florida [https: 
//perma.cc/Y5L7-DTWA]. 
258. Trip Gabriel, Republican Delegate Math Favors Donald Trump After Latest 
Wins, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/ 
10/us/politics/donald-trump-delegates.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/58A 
A-K568]. 
259. In mid-April 2016, for example, Trump had won 48 percent of the delegates 
in the 35 contests that had taken place up to that point, while winning only 
37 percent of the vote. See Harry Enten, Trump’s Right that the GOP 
Primary Is Unfair—It Favors Him, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 14, 2016, 7:01 
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trumps-right-that-the-gop-primary 
-is-unfair-it-favors-him/ [https://perma.cc/GQ46-UH7F] (showing that 
Trump won 47.6 percent of the delegate count, but only 37 percent of the 
popular vote). 
260. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Donald Trump Would Be Easy to Stop Under 
Democratic Rules, FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 7, 2016, 12:21 PM), https:// 
fivethirtyeight.com/features/donald-trump-would-be-easy-to-stop-under-
democratic-rules/ [https://perma.cc/PHY2-MRQK] (arguing that “[i]f the 
Republican nomination were contested under Democratic delegate rules 
instead, Trump would find it almost impossible to get a majority of 
delegates”); Michael Barone, Republicans Should Have Adopted Democrats’ 
Rules—And Vice Versa, Wash. Examiner (May 1, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/republicans-should-have-adopted-dem 
ocrats-rules-and-vice-versa/article/2589998 [https://perma.cc/H85R-SMBU] 
(noting that under proportional rules, Trump would have hundreds fewer 
delegates and would likely be unable to attain a majority). Ultimately, going 
into the Republican National Convention, Trump had less than 45 percent 
of the popular vote, but had garnered more than 58 percent of the pledged 
delegates. On the convention floor, he ultimately received nearly 70 percent 
of the delegates’ support. Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Presidential Primaries, 
Caucuses, and Conventions: Republican Convention, Green Papers, http:// 
www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/R [https://perma.cc/B7JZ-2BUL] (last 
modified Aug. 20, 2016). 
261. Kevin Uhrmacher et al., Republicans Adjusted Rules for Their Primaries 
After 2012, and It’s Helping Trump, Wash. Post (Mar. 9, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016election/primaries/explain
ing-the-presidential-primary-process/ [https://perma.cc/C7MB-YAPD] 
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2. Conclusions from Winner-Take-All in Party Primaries 
What to make of this historical experience? On the one hand, it has 
been argued that the use of winner-take-all contests worked well for the 
Republican Party prior to 2016 in avoiding dissension, and that the 
Democrats’ process has too often resulted in a prolonged and harmful 
struggle for the nomination.262 The Democratic Party process has also 
been plagued by an inability to winnow marginal candidates until well 
into the nominating season—a phenomenon that may or may not be 
relevant to national elections.263 On the other hand, proportional 
primary systems appear to produce nominees with broader support than 
those chosen through winner-take-all delegate allocation264 and to 
induce candidates to spend resources in a greater number of states.265 
Further, any comparative look at the two systems has to confront 
the role that winner-take-all played in the nomination of Donald 
Trump, who was able to use a divided Republican opposition to convert 
pluralities into massive delegate yields despite the opposition of the 
party establishment and a majority of Republican primary voters.266 
The 2016 Republican nomination process thus illustrates one of the 
ways in which winner-take-all can produce results at odds with popular 
sentiment. It also suggests that such effects can be magnified through 
the false mandates that winner-take-all can create—allowing a candi-
 
(“Much to the dismay of some Republicans, the party’s primary process is 
working just as intended. Designed to choose a nominee quickly, this year’s 
rules have advanced that air of inevitability forming around Donald Trump, 
who has won 15 of the first 24 contests.”). 
262. See Wayne P. Steger, Who Wins Nominations and Why?: An Updated 
Forecast of the Presidential Primary Vote, 60 Pol. Res. Q. 91, 92 (2007) 
(“Democratic nominations are divisive because the party electorate is 
divided, whereas the Republican electorate rallies around a front-runner 
early and sticks with that candidate through the primaries.”). 
263. See Wayne P. Steger et al., Candidate Competition and Attrition in 
Presidential Primaries, 1912-2000, 30 Amer. Pol. Res. 528, 548 (2002) 
(noting that the Republican Party’s winner-take-all rules “more efficiently 
drive out marginal candidates”). Note, however, that the tendency of 
Republicans to coalesce around an early front-runner predates the reform 
era, suggesting that other causes may be at play. See id. 
264. Barbara Norrander, Presidential Nomination Politics in the Post-Reform 
Era, 49 Pol. Res. Q. 875, 877 (1996). See also Barone, supra note 260. 
265. See Norrander, supra note 264, at 879 (noting that “if proportional 
representation rules are employed, . . . it makes sense for the disadvantaged 
candidate to spend a few dollars in hopes of winning some delegates”); see 
also Rideout et al., supra note 256, at 790 (“There is some 
evidence, . . . which suggests that frontrunners make more visits, all else 
equal, to winner-take-all states than do long-shot candidates.”). 
266. See supra notes 260–261 and accompanying text. 
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date to amass significant victories that provide a misleading indicator 
of his level of popular support. 
There are of course numerous differences between the party nomi-
nating contests and the general election. Nominating contests are 
staggered and take place over several months; rules, such as whether 
delegates are selected by primary or by caucus, vary significantly from 
state to state; many serious candidates may be involved in contrast to 
the two-party contests that characterize the general election, and so 
forth.267 Indeed, the many variables involved, including “delegate distri-
bution rules, delegate apportionment among the states, primary se-
quencing, regional support for candidates, ideological crowding of 
candidate fields, and campaign finance rules” have made it difficult for 
researchers to isolate the effects of any particular factor, including the 
use of winner-take-all or other sorts of delegate selection rules.268 
Nonetheless, the parties’ recent experiences suggest that proportional 
representation, despite some disadvantages, is both a more accurate 
reflection of voter sentiment and a more effective block against the 
selection of candidates who enjoy only narrow plurality support. 
III. Implications for Electoral College Reform 
This Article has argued that, among the various controversial 
features of the electoral college, its de facto incorporation of a winner-
take-all system stands out as uniquely indefensible. Unlike the other 
ways in which the electoral college diverges from strict popular prefer-
ence, the winner-take-all system evolved haphazardly as the result of 
state responses to immediate individual incentives, not as a product of 
deliberation and compromise. Further, despite the lack of forethought 
or intentionality in the establishment of a winner-take-all system, 
winner-take-all allocation remains by far the strongest driver of differ-
ences between popular and electoral margins.269 Finally, the problems 
created by winner-take-all are not limited to the possibility of producing 
an electoral winner who falls short in the popular vote. Rather, winner-
take-all contributes several additional ills to the electoral process by 
creating heightened incentives to commit voter fraud, disproportion-
ately rewarding the suppression of votes, distorting the expressive value 
of the popular vote, and inviting third-party mischief. The following 
Section argues that, as a result, focus on the problems of winner-take-
all should occupy a more central place in criticism of the electoral col-
lege and proposals for alternatives. 
 
267. Norrander, supra note 264, at 876–77. 
268. See id. at 876. 
269. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 21. 
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A. The Underemphasis of Winner-Take-All in Electoral College 
Critiques 
On the whole, the distinctive effects of the winner-take-all system 
have been underemphasized in criticism of the electoral college. Calls 
to reform or replace the electoral college have, instead, tended to lump 
the undemocratic features of the electoral college together to argue for 
their replacement in one fell swoop, generally with a system of direct 
popular election of the president.270 Such critiques have often rejected 
alternatives to winner-take-all, such as allocating electoral votes 
proportionately, because they fail to address the other ways in which 
the electoral college promotes outcomes that diverge from the popular 
vote.271 
To some extent, these arguments have a point—direct popular 
election of the president would not only eliminate the problems created 
by winner-take-all but is likely the best way of doing so. Direct election 
is much simpler to grasp than a complex system of proportional 
allocation, and may be more readily explained to Congress, state legis-
latures, or the general public.272 It would avoid the many intricacies of 
a proportional-vote scheme that would otherwise have to be resolved, 
such as how to handle fractional votes, what to do about ties or near-
ties, and whether and how to rein in third parties. Under the National 
Popular Vote Compact, direct election could potentially be effected 
gradually by the decisions of individual states; by contrast, proportional 
allocation of electoral votes at the state level provides opportunities for 
partisan mischief if done on a piecemeal basis,273 meaning that any 
reform would have to occur through constitutional amendment to avoid 
unfairly advantaging one party. 
 
270. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 155 (arguing that, of various reform 
proposals, only direct election would remedy all electoral college deficiencies). 
271. See id. at 135 (acknowledging that a fractional proportional approach would 
make more voters’ preferences relevant, but rejecting it on the grounds that 
it would still fail to count every vote equally); Abbott & Levine, supra 
note 6, at 122–23 (rejecting proportional allocation because it would continue 
to give a relative advantage to small and low-turnout states). 
272. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 132 (“The elegance of direct election 
is its simplicity.”). 
273. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Some GOP-led States Look at Electoral Vote Changes, 
CNN (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/25/politics/electoral-
college/index.html (describing efforts by Republicans with a “partisan 
motive” to eliminate winner-take-all in states such as Virginia that have 
tended to vote Democratic in presidential contests). See also Koza et al., 
supra note 3, at 683 (detailing numerous problems with adopting the 
proportional approach on a piecemeal basis, including slowly increasing the 
influence of states that retained the winner-take-all model). 
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Further, there is much to be said in favor of eliminating the 
electoral college’s other counter-majoritarian features. The two-vote 
bonus can be seen as an ineffective half-measure that fails in practice 
to protect the interests of small states—there is little evidence, for 
example, that presidential candidates campaign frequently in small 
states or are particularly attentive to their interests—while nonetheless 
threatening to produce electoral-popular divergence, as likely occurred 
in 2000.274 Likewise, the allocation of electoral votes based on population 
remains suspect for its historical roots in slavery and the disenfranchise-
ment of blacks and women275 and arguably creates inadequate incentives 
for states to extend the franchise broadly—as through, for example, 
automatic voter registration—or for parties and candidates to focus on 
turnout.276 Thus, it is understandable to some degree why proposals for 
electoral college reform do not single out winner-take-all for criticism: 
their preferred solution of direct election would eliminate the problems 
winner-take-all creates, while bringing about additional benefits. 
Despite these arguments, however, there is a strong case that 
proposals to reform the electoral college have directed inadequate fire 
toward the winner-take-all system in particular. Both philosophical and 
pragmatic reasons exist for advocates of electoral college alternatives to 
make the deficiencies of winner-take-all their central critique and 
abolishing winner-take-all their principal goal. Because a switch to 
direct popular election of the president may be the most feasible way 
of eliminating winner-take-all, this shift in focus may entail only a 
modest change in current messaging. At the same time, however, 
electoral college reform advocates should be open, under the appro-
priate circumstances, to supporting alternative proposals, such as 
proportional or bonus schemes, that eliminate or dilute winner-take-all 
while preserving some features of the current electoral college. 
B. The Case That Winner-Take-All Is the Electoral College’s Worst 
Feature 
The philosophical case for focusing on winner-take-all rests on the 
fact that the harm it does to U.S politics is both serious and multi-
faceted, and the arguments made in its defense are commensurately 
 
274. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Moreover, Gore would probably 
not have won the electoral vote under a fractional proportional approach. 
See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 135 (finding that Gore would have 
received half an electoral vote less than Bush under at least one iteration of 
the fractional proportional approach). 
275. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 33. 
276. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 123 (“Even under proportionality, 
popular votes in high-turnout states would get discounted and popular votes 
in low-turnout states would get inflated—thus contributing to the possibility 
of a wrong winner outcome.”).  
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weak. The possibility of an electoral-popular split has long been viewed 
as the greatest harm the electoral college has the potential to cause, 
and winner-take-all allocation currently contributes most strongly to 
the risk of that outcome.277 As the previous Section discussed, however, 
winner-take-all has many deficiencies beyond its potential to distort the 
popular vote, from the incentives it provides for vote suppression to the 
way in which it arbitrarily privileges certain voters.278 
While winner-take-all’s deficiencies can be readily enumerated, it is 
correspondingly difficult to find a principled defense of the system. To 
some extent, this is unsurprising, because winner-take-all became the 
prevailing system through a state-by-state search for local and partisan 
advantage, rather than a process of national discussion and compro-
mise. Thus, winner-take-all allocation of votes cannot be said to be part 
of the electoral college’s original design. Nor, for that matter, is it a 
product of the renewed consideration of voting and representation that 
occurred after the Civil War.279 Defenders of winner-take-all have, how-
ever, tended to obscure this point by lumping winner-take-all with other 
features of the electoral college, often suggesting that both are part of 
the Framers’ wisdom.280 Thus, for example, Tara Ross describes the 
unified effects of the electoral college as one of many measures instituted 
by the Framers to “give minorities more influence than they would have 
in a simple democracy.”281 In a foreword to Ross’s book, George Will 
decries efforts to change any aspect of the electoral college, including 
winner-take-all, arguing that reformers “appeal to single-minded—
hence simple-minded—majoritarians” who fail to take the “wiser path” 
of “study[ing] the logic and rationale that prompted the Framers to 
 
277. See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, 
Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2526, 2533 
(2001) [hereinafter The Electoral College Debate] (observing that “the effects 
of the winner-take-all feature generally dominate all other effects, and though 
it may sometimes benefit large states, its impact in any given election will 
be unpredictable because small shifts of support among large states can easily 
change the electoral outcome”). As previously discussed, other electoral 
college mechanisms may have had a greater influence historically; for 
example, when states restricted ballot access by blacks or women, the 
allocation of electoral votes based on population had a more significant effect. 
See supra Part I.B. 
278. See supra Part II.A.1. 
279. See supra Part I.B. 
280. See The Electoral College Debate, supra note 277, at 2541 (“Many articles 
in the popular press have, in the wake of the 2000 election, sung the Framers’ 
praises and hailed their foresight in designing the Constitution to protect 
small states and our federal structure from ‘simple-minded 
majoritarianism.’”). 
281. Ross, supra note 9, at 40. 
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avoid a national popular election . . . .”282 Likewise, Alexander Bickel 
has argued that the electoral college formed part of the Framers’ efforts 
“to approximate the true representation of the people by providing 
many different ways of counting heads,” thus avoiding “a simple and 
invariable majoritarianism [that] has never been what we have meant 
by democracy.”283 
These defenses blur the distinction between the distinct 
mechanisms—the two-vote bonus, population-based electoral vote 
allocation, and winner-take-all voting—by which the electoral college 
may diverge from the popular result, and further ignores that the 
Framers’ original design included independent voting by electors,284 a 
feature that has long been absent from the electoral college process. 
Further, given that the emergence of winner-take-all was utterly 
unforeseen when the Constitution was drafted, defenders face a higher 
burden to show how this specific device is consistent with the Framers’ 
goals—a difficult hurdle to meet. As this Article has argued repeatedly, 
the key feature of winner-take-all is the arbitrariness with which it 
distributes power and alters popular results. While one might argue 
that principles of federalism demand special solicitude for small states 
or that a notion of virtual representation mandates population-based 
vote allocation, no comparable structural principle explains why resi-
dents of, say, Florida and New Hampshire should have more sway over 
election outcomes than residents of California and Wyoming.285 
To the extent winner-take-all has been defended on its own merits, 
many arguments in its favor are inadequately reasoned and uncon-
vincing. Some defenders emphasize, for example, that the hurdle of 
winner-take-all can be overcome through wise allocation of campaign 
resources.286 But such arguments fail to explain why it is desirable to 
require candidates to overcome an essentially meaningless hurdle in the 
first place, nor how the country benefits from campaigns that focus 
narrowly on a small number of swing states. Other defenses are based 
on faulty assumptions, arguing that winner-takes-all benefits racial 
 
282. Id. at xi. 
283. Bickel, supra note 158, at 15. 
284. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
285. For an account of the degree to which such disparities in voter power were 
present in the 2016 election, see Gelman, supra note 213. 
286. See Althouse, supra note 7, at 1012; Best, supra note 9, at 66. 
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minorities287 or rural voters288 when in fact it appears to do the opposite 
in both cases,289 or asserting that winner-take-all forces candidates to 
appeal to many states290 where the historical evidence suggests that, 
instead, it often offers disproportionate rewards to candidates with 
regional appeal.291 
More general thoughts that the electoral college, presumably 
including winner-take-all, encourages “moderation”292 and “national 
consensus”293 while hindering the chances that “extremist factions” will 
come to power294 are speculation supported by little evidence, and ring 
almost comically hollow in the wake of the 2016 election, in which 
Donald Trump—surely one of the most divisive figures in U.S. history—
owed both his primary295 and general election296 victories substantially 
to winner-take-all allocation. Indeed, one could easily engage in the 
counter-speculation that winner-take-all is most likely to enable the rise 
 
287. See Best, supra note 9, at 208 (arguing that the electoral college enhances 
the influence of “well-organized urban minorities”); Bickel, supra note 158, 
at 13 (arguing that the electoral college gives more power to racial or ethnic 
minorities). 
288. See Ross, supra note 9, at 81 (contending that the electoral college gives 
“[s]mall states, rural areas and sparsely populated regions” a “voice” that 
they would lack under direct election). 
289. See supra notes 203 and 205 and accompanying text. 
290. See Ross, supra note 9, at 79 (stating—incorrectly—that because of the 
electoral college, “[p]residential candidates . . . tour the nation, campaigning 
in all states”). 
291. See Longley & Peirce, supra note 108, at 158–59 (arguing that third-
party candidates with concentrated regional strength, such as Strom 
Thurmond or George Wallace, are benefited by winner-take-all). 
292. See Best, supra note 9, at 98. 
293. See Kathryn Jean Lopez, Hillary Is Wrong: An Interview with Charles R. 
Kesler, Nat’l Rev. Online (Nov. 13, 2000), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20010120071025/http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogato
ry111300.shtml [https://perma.cc/BV92-BQPX]. 
294. See Ross, supra note 9, at 98. 
295. See Silver, supra note 260 (explaining that Trump would have been unlikely 
to win the Republican nomination had delegates been awarded 
proportionately). 
296. See Lessig, supra note 22 (presenting analysis suggesting that Trump would 
have lost the election under a fractional proportional allocation scheme). See 
also Derek T. Muller, Five Fictional Electoral College Outcomes from the 
2016 Presidential Election, Excess of Democracy (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/2/five-fictional-electoral-college-
outcomes-from-the-2016-presidential-election [https://perma.cc/LQ72-8T3A] 
(re-analyzing the 2016 election results according to five different alternative 
vote allocation systems). 
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of polarizing candidates. That is, if one assumes—as currently appears 
to be the case297—that swing states are dominated by approximately 
equal numbers of unpersuadable partisans of each party, the candidate 
with the most passionate supporters may be most likely to have a small 
edge in turnout sufficient to win all the state’s electoral votes. Thus, 
candidates may have an incentive to appeal strongly to a narrow, 
intensely opinionated group rather than try to win over a broader swath 
of centrist voters.298 
As an additional argument, some have suggested that the 
disproportionate campaign resources expended on swing states ensures 
that voters in influential states will also be the best-informed or that 
candidates will be forced to tailor their appeals to reach voters in the 
middle.299 Both of these assumptions, however, are flawed. Little to no 
empirical evidence supports the idea that persuadable voters in swing 
states are more knowledgeable than others; indeed, most studies have 
suggested that undecided voters are generally more poorly informed.300 
Likewise, as more Americans have become hardened partisans, cam-
paign strategy in swing states has evolved toward turning out already-
committed voters rather than persuading undecided ones.301 It is a 
mistake, therefore, to see swing states as moderate or centrist; rather, 
 
297. See Peter Grier, The Number of Undecided Voters in the U.S. Won’t Stop 
Shrinking, Christian Sci. Monitor (Jun. 29, 2015), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/the-number-of-undecided-voters-in-the-us-wont-stop-
shrinking-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/P4Q4-AWTL] (explaining that the 
number of undecided voters is declining, most nominally undecided voters 
tend to actually affiliate with one of the major parties, and as a result “big 
political campaigns are increasingly focusing on their own partisans, instead 
of trying to win over undecideds”). 
298. Writing in 2004, Paul Boudreaux conceived a scenario of this sort that bears 
more than a passing resemblance to the 2016 election. Boudreaux suggested 
that in the future, anxiety over gay marriage and Muslim cultural influence 
might lead to a “traditional American family values” party espousing 
“ethnic, religious, and cultural intolerance of those who do not fit the mold 
of the traditional Christian lifestyle.” Boudreaux, supra note 222, at 234. 
Such a candidate, Boudreaux speculated, could win the electoral college 
through narrow pluralities in conservative states even while decisively losing 
the popular vote due to wide margins of defeat in blue states. Id. at 235. 
299. See Ross, supra note 9, at 79–80 (arguing that the electoral college provides 
incentives for candidates to build wide, national, non-ideological coalitions). 
300. See, e.g, Palfrey & Poole, supra note 215, at 530; Bawn et al., supra note 
180, at 9. 
301. See Grier, supra note 297; see also Ronald Brownstein & Leah Askarinam, 
The Tipping Points of the 2016 Election, Atlantic (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/the-tipping-points-
of-the-2016-election/505238/ [https://perma.cc/R4GD-WTJY] (explaining 
in detail how swing states are increasingly driven by “stark demographic 
divides” that go hand in hand with partisan affiliation). 
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they are simply states that happen, by virtue of geographical fortuity, 
to have approximately equal numbers of partisan Democrats and parti-
san Republicans, often inhabiting different areas of the state and feeling 
little affinity for each other.302 Even if it were true that voters in close 
states were slightly more moderate or more knowledgeable on average, 
it is unclear that this would justify giving such voters either the burden 
or the benefit of the wildly disproportionate power they now exercise.303 
Some commentators have argued that winner-take-all simply does 
not matter a great deal because it has little effect on the outcome. Ann 
Althouse argues that races producing a popular-electoral split are 
generally close; in such elections, “all one really needs is a device to 
determine an outcome” and “the traditional method . . . should have 
the most power to bring stability and legitimacy.”304 Althouse notes, for 
example, that the popular-electoral split of 2000 did not bring about 
the crisis many commentators in the 1960s and 1970s had feared.305 Yet 
the public shrug at George W. Bush’s popular vote defeat shows only 
that under a highly specific set of circumstances, including an extra-
ordinarily close popular and electoral split as well as a Supreme Court 
battle that focused attention elsewhere,306 one particular fear articulated 
by past commentators proved to be overblown. It ignores the other 
ways, both subtle and not, in which winner-take-all has proved 
destabilizing by creating electoral margins that are a misleading signal 
of public support, by inviting fraud and voter suppression, and by en-
couraging candidates to adopt messages narrowly targeted to small 
constituencies in swing states. 
A last-ditch version of the argument against changing winner-take-
all rests on a defense of the electoral college more generally—in short, 
that the institution as a whole has provided stability and that to tamper 
with any piece of it would invite disruption. In discussing efforts to 
reform the electoral process in general, Alexander Bickel has cautioned 
that while “[t]here may be a time when societies can digest radical 
structural change . . . . We are not such a society. We do well to remain 
attached to institutions . . . .”307 Judith Best likewise argues that one 
 
302. See Brownstein & Askaranam, supra note 301.  
303. As a popular tweet sardonically put it, “democracy is this cool system where 
you yell at people online for 6 months and then people in Ohio and Florida 
pick the president.” Alboo (@bromanconsul), Twitter (June 14, 2016, 1:00 
AM), https://twitter.com/bromanconsul/status/742627660367429632?lang 
=en [https://perma.cc/8FER-ESBZ]. 
304. See Althouse, supra note 7, at 1013. 
305. See id. at 1013–14. 
306. Id. at 1011. 
307. Bickel, supra note 158, at 3. 
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of the principal advantages of the electoral college is that it “promises 
stability.”308 Defenders have argued more specifically that abolishing the 
electoral college may bring radical changes, such as the runaway growth 
of third parties, that are difficult to foresee or contain.309 A problem 
with these arguments, however, is that they generally address only a 
narrow question: whether the electoral college as a whole should be 
replaced by direct election of the president. Indeed, many electoral 
college defenses are less arguments for why all its features—particularly 
winner-take-all—are better than the alternatives than they are 
enumerations of the potential problems that direct election might 
pose.310 Yet the electoral college could at least in theory be reformed 
without eliminating all of its elements entirely, and alternatives other 
than direct election exist. Further, as previously noted, arguments that 
the electoral college promotes stability and moderate, mainstream 
candidates are substantially undermined by the results of the 2016 
election.311 
In the end, many defenses of winner-take-all have the uncomfort-
able appearance of an effort to come up with a post hoc rationalization 
of anomalous results. As one commentator noted of the 2000 election: 
“The problem is that no conceivable justification for the electoral 
college can simultaneously rationalize the actual result, in which Gore 
won the popular vote but lost the election, and the virtually identical 
scenario in which he wins the election but loses the popular vote.”312 
 
308. See Best, supra note 9, at 217. 
309. See Ross, supra note 9, at 41 (arguing that the electoral college limits the 
growth of “extremist or unhealthy” third parties); Best, supra note 9, at 99 
(arguing that the electoral college is desirable because it “minimizes third-
party strength”); Bickel, supra note 158, at 22 (contending that, by 
suppressing third-party candidates, the electoral college helps “enable[] us to 
achieve a politics of coalition and accommodation rather than of ideological 
and charismatic fragmentation, governments that are moderate, and a 
regime that is stable”). 
310. Judith Best’s defense of the electoral college, for example, is titled The Case 
Against Direct Election of the President. See Best, supra note 9, at 216. 
Ross’s book, which considers electoral college reforms other than direct 
election, is a partial exception, although many of Ross’s pro-Electoral College 
arguments are primarily objections to direct election. See Ross, supra note 
9, at 149. 
311. See supra Part I.B. 
312. See The Electoral College Debate, supra note 277, at 2541. As the author 
elaborated, “Why . . . do we have an electoral college that says that Al Gore 
should lose the 2000 presidential election even though he won more votes? 
There may be good federalism-based reasons, but none of them survives 
empirical scrutiny. For example, perhaps the electoral college made a loser of 
Al Gore because he lost too many small states, and small states are important. 
Or perhaps his support was overly concentrated in New York and California, 
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Perhaps the best way of evaluating winner-take-all is to compare it 
to the other counter-majoritarian features of the electoral college, which 
represent negotiated tradeoffs between constituencies and judgments 
about the wisdom of various approaches. At the Constitutional Con-
vention, the two-vote bonus was a necessary part of securing the 
support of small states that worried their interests would be neglected 
in a system of direct presidential election.313 Likewise, population-based 
representation was an issue of acute concern at the Constitutional 
Convention;314 strikingly, even post-Civil War, Congress opted after ex-
tensive deliberation to continue a primarily population-based system, 
despite legislators’ recognition of the injustice of the three-fifths clause 
and determination to prevent southern states from ever again gaining 
excess representation based on a disenfranchised black population.315 It 
is easy to see why states considered themselves to have such a strong 
stake in these decisions, which represented clear tradeoffs between state 
interests, as determined by clear, non-arbitrary characteristics of state 
populations. 
None of this is to suggest that the compromises arrived at by the 
Constitutional Convention and the 39th Congress on these questions 
are exempt from criticism or that the judgments they represent cannot 
be revisited. The two-vote bonus, for example, has been criticized as 
anachronistic and unfair.316 Further, although the matter was certainly 
the subject of some debate at the Constitutional Convention, the ulti-
mate outcome can be seen as a hasty, expedient resolution of what was 
regarded at the time—due to the likely election of George Washington 
under any system—as a secondary issue.317 Population-based state 
representation likewise can be assailed on many grounds, from its 
origins in the protection of slavery to the lack of incentive it provides 
to extend the franchise or increase turnout. Such arguments have con-
siderable force, and help make the case for a switch to direct election, 
 
where he accumulated ‘wasted votes.’ Or perhaps he was merely a ‘regional’ 
candidate. None of these reasons makes sense in the context of the 2000 
election, however, because none explains the equally plausible scenario in 
which Al Gore wins the electoral vote. A shift of a mere 538 votes from any 
state that Gore won to Florida would have produced a Gore victory without 
his gaining a single vote.” Id. at 2540. See also Longley & Braun, supra 
note 2, at 22 (quoting political scientist John P. Roche describing the electoral 
college as a “jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been endowed 
with a high theoretical content”). 
313. See Slonim, supra note 51, at 40. 
314. See supra Part I.A. 
315. See supra Part I.B. 
316. The Electoral College Debate, supra note 277, at 2537–40. 
317. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 11. 
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which would eliminate in one stroke these other undemocratic features 
of the electoral college along with winner-take-all. 
At the same time, however, a meaningful distinction should be 
drawn between the features of the electoral college that vary from direct 
popular election by design318 and winner-take-all, which has no such 
justification. An election in which a popular vote runner-up wins the 
electoral college vote through disproportionate popularity in small 
states represents the system, for better or worse, working as intended; 
the electoral college compromise was crafted precisely in order to give 
small states this sort of additional influence.319 By contrast, the award 
of a large state’s entire slate of electoral votes to a candidate who has 
edged out a three-digit plurality in that state’s vote is a purely fortu-
itous occurrence, reflecting no national debate about the desirability of 
such an outcome. 
Further, leaving aside the lucky candidate and his supporters, the 
second result does not systematically benefit anyone in particular and 
so cannot be seen as a compromise among competing interests. By con-
trast, the electoral college’s other counter-majoritarian features were 
expressly intended to confer an advantage on, or at least remove a 
disadvantage from, states with particular characteristics—respectively, 
a smaller-than-average population and a population with a smaller-
than-average percentage of eligible voters. These preferences may or 
may not be desirable, but they are at least rational. Winner-take-all, 
on the other hand, to the extent it confers any advantage, does so on 
closely divided states. Yet relatively few states are battleground 
states—nine or ten in recent elections,320 a number that has been declin-
ing for decades321—so such benefits are not widely distributed.322 
Further, closely divided states are not a recognized constituency, and 
there is no particular reason why they should share common interests 
 
318. See The Electoral College Debate, supra note 277, at 2533 (noting that the 
two-vote bonus distorts the popular vote but is a “direct product of the 
Framers’ original constitutional design”). 
319. See id. at 2530 (arguing that, of the Framers’ original justifications for the 
electoral college, only one—“the desire to strike an appropriate balance 
between large-state and small-state representation in presidential selection”—
continues to be “valid and important”). 
320. See Leatherby & Harris, supra note 199. 
321. See id. (arguing that voters’ increasing polarization decreases the number of 
swing states); see also FairVote, The Shrinking Battleground: The 2008 
Presidential Election and Beyond 1, http://archive.fairvote.org/media/perp/ 
Shrinking_Battleground_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPK9-KJ37] (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2017). 
322. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 441–45 (discussing the fact that in 2012, 
more than 90 percent of advertising dollars, field offices, and other campaign 
resources were concentrated in a handful of states). 
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or receive special solicitude. The category of “swing states” is made all 
the more meaningless by its arbitrariness, as the states that are closely 
contested change from year to year. Some states have been closely 
fought in several elections;323 others have not been seriously contested 
for more than a century;324 yet another, small group of states has moved 
back and forth between “swing” and “safe” categories.325 Additionally 
underscoring that “closeness” is not an immutable or terribly meaning-
ful state characteristic, in many cases trivial changes in state boundaries 
would produce a different result. An interactive tool popular after the 
2016 election demonstrated, for example, that Hillary Clinton would 
have won the electoral vote had just four counties been moved across 
state lines.326 Thus, winner-take-all does not just confer special power 
on certain states; it does so unpredictably and arbitrarily. 
Even if we were somehow to regard “closeness” as a relevant quality 
deserving of special status, it is far from clear that the electoral college 
confers on swing states an unmitigated benefit. When the citizens of a 
state can arrive at a strong consensus on which presidential candidate 
they prefer, it is easy to see why they might wish for their state to have 
the maximum possible ability to translate that preference into influence 
over the national result. When a closely divided state is won by 115 or 
537 votes,327 however, the award of the state’s entire electoral slate to 
a single candidate disadvantages nearly as many state citizens as it 
advantages.328 
 
323. See id. at 454 (noting that Pennsylvania has been a battleground state in 
several elections, although it was not in 2012). 
324. See id. at 453 (“The year 2012 is the 100th anniversary of the last time the 
popular-vote margin in Utah and Nebraska was less than 6%.”). 
325. See id. at 454 (“After decades of voting solidly Republican in presidential 
elections, Virginia and North Carolina suddenly emerged as battleground 
states in 2008 . . . .”). 
326. See Christopher Ingraham, How the Electoral College Gerrymanders the 
Presidential Vote, Wash. Post:  Wonkblog (Nov. 29, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/how-the-electoral-
college-gerrymanders-the-presidential-vote/?utm_term=.ab6fd4ee0ac4 [https: 
//perma.cc/B4RQ-XUHR]. 
327. These are, respectively, John F. Kennedy’s Hawaii margin in 1960, and 
George W. Bush’s in Florida in 2000. See Leip, supra note 62. 
328. Of course, the argument can be made that swing state voters, win or lose, 
derive benefits other than sway over electoral outcomes; they receive 
disproportionate attention from candidates and may receive special solicitude 
from the president’s party in designing legislation and bestowing funds. See, 
e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 191, at 1272 (noting the “rampant coddling” of swing 
states, which he criticizes as “parochialism”). These benefits are, however, 
difficult to defend on any principled grounds; it is hard to see why living in a 
closely divided state should entitle someone to additional disaster relief, for 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017 
Losing Bargain 
378 
C. The Practical Consequences of a Winner-Take-All Focus 
If we regard the winner-take-all feature of the electoral college as 
uniquely indefensible, what are the consequences? 
To begin with, defenders of the electoral college should be 
challenged specifically to explain why the winner-take-all feature of the 
electoral college is better than alternatives. Defenders of winner-take-
all electoral vote assignment have argued, for example, that the system 
has historically produced clear results, without the necessity of invoking 
the contingency feature for deciding elections in the House;329 they 
likewise contend that winner-take-all supports the two-party system 
because third parties have difficulty in garnering a meaningful number 
of electoral votes.330 Some have also argued that it promotes federalism 
for control of voting to be left to the states and for states to be seen as 
independent units in a presidential election.331 But even if one regards 
these as desirable goals, they do not specifically justify a winner-take-
all system because there are many other ways of achieving them. For 
example, a system of proportional allocation like that used in Demo-
cratic primaries, in which a candidate is entitled to a share of a state’s 
delegates only after exceeding a certain threshold of votes,332 might well 
be similarly effective in marginalizing third-party candidates and avoid-
ing contested elections. Likewise, if the role of the House in resolving 
presidential contests is problematic, it could be replaced by another 
mechanism such as a runoff, a feature that has been included in many 
reform proposals.333 Finally, proportional allocation and bonus-vote 
plans—under which the national popular-vote victor would receive 
additional electoral votes334—are similar to winner-takes-all in providing 
for state-focused elections rather than a single national one. 
 
example. Moreover, as swing state status shifts frequently, a state cannot plan 
for or count on such benefits. 
329. See Best, supra note 9, at 210. 
330. See id. at 90–91. 
331. See Boudreaux, supra note 222, at 195–96 (describing this argument but 
critiquing it on grounds that “today’s electoral systems serves no purpose of 
real federalism, under which states would exercise independent sovereignty”). 
332. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 130. 
333. Another alternative is to allow a plurality electoral vote winner to become 
president, as an amendment proposed in 1950 to make allocation of electoral 
votes proportional would have done. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 139. 
By contrast, relying on winner-take-all to produce results that do not need 
House resolution is both risky—because it relies on past experience that may 
not continue to hold true—and unnecessary. 
334. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 141–42. 
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At the same time, it may be helpful for opponents of the electoral 
college to acknowledge that some of the institution’s undemocratic fea-
tures both have more inherent legitimacy than winner-take-all and—
because they implicate fixed, identifiable state interests—may, in 
practice, face the stiffest resistance to change. The late-1960s efforts to 
institute direct election by constitutional amendment—the nearest the 
country has come since the Twelfth Amendment to electoral college 
abolition or serious reform—attracted persistent opposition from some 
small states, even as others supported the measure.335 It is notable that 
some small states persisted in their opposition notwithstanding evidence 
that large states are the primary electoral college beneficiaries.336 
Similarly, representatives in the 39th Congress rejected voter-based 
representation in both Congress and the electoral college in favor of 
representation based on population,337 despite ample opportunity and 
incentives to opt for the former. While the enfranchisement of African-
Americans and women has made the issue less salient, states still vary 
substantially in the percentages of their citizens who can and do vote, 
meaning that certain states would lose power relative to the status quo 
in a system of direct election. 
To be sure, attempts to reform winner-take-all may run into a 
similar perception that it will produce winners and losers: the current 
electoral map combined with the winner-take-all feature is currently 
perceived to confer an advantage on the Republican Party, and the 
2000 and 2016 popular-electoral splits in the Republican candidate’s 
favor are likely to cement this perception.338 At the same time, history 
suggests that both the facts of partisan benefit in the electoral college 
 
335. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 176–77 (arguing that many factors 
contributed to the amendment’s downfall and small-state senators did not, 
for the most part, disproportionately oppose it). Nonetheless, those small-
state senators who did object to the proposal tended to cite potential loss of 
influence as a basis for their opposition. See id. at 164. More recently, 
electoral college defender Tara Ross has pointed out that, while small states 
might not be particularly influential in our current system, they would have 
even less sway under a direct election system. See Ross, supra note 9, at 82; 
see also Althouse, supra note 7, at 1006 (noting that while, in the 1960s and 
70s, “[d]irect vote proponents disparaged as ‘parochial’ the criticisms based 
on which groups would win and which would lose,” nonetheless “concerns of 
this kind may surely defeat reform”). 
336. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text. 
338. See Sean Darling-Hammond, The Electoral College Is Even More Biased 
Than You Think. But Democrats Can Beat It., Nation (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-electoral-college-is-even-more-biased 
-than-you-think-heres-how-democrats-can-beat-it/ [https://perma.cc/W7D 
P-8TJN] (arguing that “[s]tates identified as Republican strongholds, . . . are 
more over-represented, on average, than states of any other partisan bent”). 
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and popular beliefs on the subject are likely to shift over time. In 1991, 
Abbott and Levine argued that the electoral college was, in fact, tilted 
in favor of Democrats,339 and the following year the substantial electoral 
victory of Bill Clinton—winner of just a 42 percent plurality in the 
popular vote—seemed to bear this out.340 Following the 2012 election, 
when Barack Obama won both the popular and electoral vote by 
comfortable margins, the idea that Democrats had an inherent electoral 
college advantage, even a “stranglehold,”341 was widely circulated,342 in-
cluding by the man—Donald Trump—who would go on in the next 
election to benefit from the electoral college’s winner-take-all feature.343 
The future election of a Democratic president by a larger electoral than 
popular margin may again shift perceptions about which party enjoys 
an electoral college advantage, and may thus be an opportune moment 
to press for reform. 
D. Reform Proposals and Winner-Take-All 
Centralizing the goal of eliminating winner-take-all also has 
implications for the sort of alternatives that reformers should embrace. 
Advocates of electoral college reform should, for example, avoid 
solutions—such as allocating electoral votes based on congressional 
district—that would simply replicate the winner-take-all problem on a 
smaller scale.344 At the same time, reformers should arguably be open 
to proposals that preserve some current features of the electoral college 
while eliminating winner-takes-all. This is not to suggest that reformers 
should abandon the hope of direct election, which may well be both the 
best and the most feasible alternative proposal to the current system. 
 
339. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 146–49. 
340. See Victor Williams & Alison M. Macdonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 
1 and Its Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s 
Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77 Marq. L. 
Rev. 201, 227–29 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he unit/winner-take-all method of 
casting electoral college votes that predominates in the states created the 
appearance of a clear mandate for the victor, Bill Clinton” despite his 
lackluster performance in the popular vote). 
341. See Chris Cillizza, Democrats’ Stranglehold on the Electoral College, in 1 
GIF, Wash. Post (June 10, 2014),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/thefix/wp/2014/06/10/democrats-strangehold-on-the-electoral-college-
in-1-gif/?utm_term=.5b71bbd47a32 [https://perma.cc/RC8Y-BKV6]. 
342. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, In 2016 Race, an Electoral College Edge for 
Democrats, Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2015),  https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/in-2016-race-an-electoral-college-edge-for-democrats/2015/03/ 
15/855f2792-cb3c-11e4-a2a7-9517a3a70506_story.html?utm_term=.8aaf4f9 
741a3 [https://perma.cc/J7WT-UB96]. 
343. See Kessler, supra note 5. 
344. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 127. 
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At the same time, it is not necessarily justifiable to dismiss alternatives 
such as proportional allocation, as some reform leaders have, as 
“mak[ing] a bad system even worse.”345 
1. Direct Election: Proposals and Historical Experience 
Direct popular election is, for fairly obvious reasons,346 an intuitively 
appealing alternative that has long been the favored choice of electoral 
college reformers. It is the only plan that is the subject of a current, 
ongoing legislative effort in the form of the National Popular Vote Com-
pact.347 Further, it is the electoral college alternative that has come 
closest to fruition. In the late 1960s, Congress came close to passing a 
constitutional amendment that would have abolished the electoral 
college and replaced it with a direct election system under which a run-
off would be held if no candidate reached 40 percent of the vote.348 
To be sure, even from the start, the plan—which passed the House 
as Joint Resolution 681349—was not entirely without controversy. Ini-
tially, President Nixon, while supporting the overall concept of reform, 
preferred a plan to divide electoral votes proportionately,350 and legis-
lators quibbled over whether a 50 percent runoff cutoff might be pre-
ferable before finally voting to reject an amendment to change the 40 
percent rule.351 Ultimately, however, the House voted overwhelmingly—
338 to 70—and on a bipartisan basis to pass the plan, with Democrats 
supporting it 184-44 and Republicans 154-26.352 Representatives of both 
 
345. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 680. Elsewhere, however, Koza et al. 
concede that a fractional proportional approach would be preferable to 
winner-take-all. See id. at 139 (acknowledging that the fractional 
proportional approach would “improve upon the current situation” by 
making more votes “politically relevant”). 
346. Direct election would, of course, completely eliminate the winner-take-all 
problem as well as the other undemocratic aspects of the electoral college. 
Further, it is a simple, readily comprehensible reform. 
347. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 258. 
348. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 137–38. 
349. Id. at 153. 
350. See id. at 142. In addition, John Mitchell, then U.S. Attorney General, 
testified—though, critics carped, with little evidence—that greater state 
support existed for the proportional plan. See id. at 145–46 (quoting 
Mitchell’s testimony). 
351. See id. at 150–51 (explaining that amendment was initially passed and then 
defeated on a subsequent teller vote). 
352. Id. at 152. 
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the largest and the smallest states likewise both voted in favor of the 
resolution.353 
The House’s passage of the joint resolution was hailed in the media 
and proved popular with the public; further, it ultimately received the 
backing—albeit somewhat lukewarm—of President Nixon, despite his 
earlier preference for a proportional system.354 A survey of state legis-
lative leaders and governors found that, while substantial support 
existed, the numbers were still a few short of the thirty-eight that would 
ultimately be needed for ratification.355 Meanwhile, procedural delays in 
the Senate resulted in some loss of momentum.356 By the time the bill 
was finally voted out of committee in 1970,357 the opposition had gained 
force,358 and it began to look doubtful that proponents could muster the 
needed two-thirds.359 The bill faced a variety of obstacles: the still-
halfhearted support of the president,360 continued worries about the 
runoff provision,361 doubts by small-state and conservative senators,362 
and—most crucially—opposition by southerners, who worried that 
national elections would weaken state power and perhaps also increase 
black turnout or stifle regional third-party candidates such as George 
Wallace.363 Eventually, these southern senators led a successful, though 
controversial, filibuster and killed the bill.364 Notably, cloture votes 
showed little variation based on state size—though the largest ten 
states were the most supportive of bill365—but significant differences 
based on region; large majorities of senators from all regions voted for 
cloture except for less than one quarter of southern senators and less 
 
353. See id. at 153. There were some ominous sectional differences, however, with 
about half of Southern Democrats opposed to the plan. Id. at 152. 
354. See id. at 156. 
355. Id. at 157. 
356. See id. at 158–60. 
357. See id. at 160. 
358. See id. at 165. 
359. See id. (noting that support was always at least seven votes short of the 
minimum needed). 
360. See id. at 163 (observing that Nixon appeared to respond to events rather 
than exercise leadership). 
361. See id. at 164. 
362. See id. at 166. 
363. Id. at 166. 
364. See id. at 169–174. 
365. See id. at 175. 
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than half from mountain states.366 Ideology also appears to have played 
a role, with more liberal legislators in both the House367 and Senate368 
being more likely to have supported reform. 
The National Popular Vote Compact, conceived in the wake of the 
2000 electoral-popular split,369 takes a different approach to achieving a 
similar result. Based on an idea initially developed by law professors 
Robert W. Bennett, Akhil Reed Amar, and Vikram David Amar,370 the 
plan takes advantages of states’ constitutional power to determine how 
their electors should be appointed. It provides that, at such time in the 
future when states “cumulatively possessing a majority of the electoral 
votes shall have enacted this agreement in substantially the same form,” 
the signatory states will be bound to appoint the electoral slate pledged 
to the national popular vote winner.371 At the time of writing, the plan 
had been enacted in eleven states with a total of 165 electoral votes, 
meaning that it must be passed in only enough additional states to con-
stitute another 105 votes before it can become law.372 
While in the abstract this sounds like a potentially surmountable 
hurdle, the pace of enactments has slowed considerably. The last state 
to enact the compact did so in 2014, and there is a clear partisan pattern 
to the enactments; all states that have signed on to the compact so far 
have also voted for the Democratic candidate in the last several presi-
dential elections.373 While supporters initially hoped that enough states 
would agree to the compact for it to take effect in 2012, this ambition 
obviously did not come to pass.374 Numerous criticisms have been made 
of the plan, including its lack of a recount mechanism and the overall 
undesirability of effecting change to federal elections on a state-by-
 
366. See id. at 176. 
367. See id. at 155. 
368. See id. at 177. 
369. Koza et al., supra note 3, at 279. 
370. See id. at 281–83. 
371. Id. at 258–59. 
372. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, Nat’l Popular Vote, 
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status [https://perma.cc/ZQT 
4-ECMW]. The plan has been enacted in California, the District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The bill has passed one 
legislative chamber in a number of other states; it has been introduced in all 
fifty states. Id. 
373. See id. (identifying the states that passed the proposal); Leip, supra note 62 
(identifying states that voted for the Democratic candidate in the most 
recent presidential election). 
374. See Williams, supra note 109, at 176. 
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state, sub-constitutional level.375  Some commentators have suggested 
in addition that the plan may be constitutionally infirm under the Com-
pact Clause.376 
The National Popular Vote Compact is a creative and commend-
able approach to a difficult problem, and its historical moment may yet 
come. At the same time, supporters should not underestimate the 
magnitude of the change it proposes or the novelty of the mechanism 
it uses to effect such change. In any case, there is room both to consider 
alternative reform proposals and to contemplate what sort of arguments 
might win the compact additional support. 
2. Alternatives to Direct Election Proposals 
As the previous Section detailed, direct election has long been the 
preferred option for most reformers. However, it is important to note 
that the mechanism by which direct election eliminates winner-take-all 
is by abolishing—by definition—the features of the electoral college that 
cause it to differ from the national popular vote. There is, of course, 
much to be said for abandoning these features, and on balance it is 
likely the right thing to do. But even fervent advocates of direct election 
should take into account the arguments—both pragmatic and philo-
sophical—for retaining these features, which are significantly stronger 
than the arguments in favor of winner-take-all. One way of acknowl-
edging these arguments is to seriously entertain alternatives for 
electoral college reform. 
Historically, electoral college reform proposals other than direct 
election have tended to fall within a few major categories. Some efforts 
have been directed at removing the possibility of faithless electors377—
a reasonable cause but today a largely irrelevant one.378 Another 
common variety of proposal has been to award electoral votes by 
congressional district with the “constant two” going to the state 
winner,379 the plan currently used in Nebraska and Maine.380 This ver-
sion of the electoral college, essentially a more fine-grained version of 
 
375. See id. at 179–80. But see Amar, supra note 135, at 252–53 (proposing that, 
if the required number of states were to enact the compact, Congress could 
enact supplemental rules to address such problems). 
376. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular 
Vote Interstate Compact, 6 Election L.J. 372 (2008). 
377. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 43–49 (“[T]he automatic plan 
would eliminate the office of elector while . . . retaining all other aspects of 
the existing electoral college’s allocation and counting of votes.”). 
378. In other words, the possibility that faithless electors will sway an election is 
today vanishingly unlikely. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
379. Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 57. 
380. See id. at 99. 
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the current one, has been described as creating a “series of miniature 
winner-take-all elections” in most of the country while resulting in no 
change at all to the smallest states, which would continue to award all 
three of their electoral votes to the winner regardless of margin.381 As a 
result, it is subject to most of the criticisms of the current winner-take-
all system as well as some new ones, such as the notion that separation 
of powers would be “dangerously weakened” by using identical geo-
graphical boundaries for the presidency and for Congress.382 
The first of these reforms, then, would leave the current winner-
take-all system undisturbed, while the second would substitute a differ-
ent and equally problematic form of winner-take-all. By contrast, two 
other reforms—proportional counting of electoral votes, provided 
fractional votes are allowed,383 and the award of bonus votes to the 
national popular vote victor—would eliminate or minimize the winner-
take-all feature, while leaving the electoral college’s other counter-
majoritarian elements substantially in place. As noted, there is at least 
a colorable case for taking such an approach. 
The case for retaining the two-vote bonus is primarily, though 
perhaps not exclusively, a pragmatic one. Realistically, eliminating the 
bonus requires small states to give up some measure of power and 
relevance. This reality has fueled opposition to electoral college 
reform,384 including, to some degree, the Bayh-Celler plan described 
above—the electoral college reform proposal that has come closest to 
success in United States history.385 This sentiment may be puzzling, 
considering that some analysis suggests that the current configuration 
of the electoral college gives more influence in practice to large states. 
As others have argued, however, the extra votes small states wield in 
the electoral college may have symbolic significance that transcends 
such real-world mechanics.386 Further, even if the electoral college does 
 
381. Id. at 57. 
382. See id. at 63–64. 
383. If electoral votes are rounded, winner-take-all effects would again appear in 
miniature, conferring arbitrary benefits on the candidate who happened to 
benefit from the rounding. See Koza et al., supra note 3, at 165–66. 
384. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 142 (noting that senators from 
particularly large or small states have been disproportionately likely to 
oppose electoral college reform efforts). 
385. While many small-state senators supported the plan and its primary 
opponents were from southern states, some small-state senators remained 
adamantly opposed. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 166 (noting 
that one source of opposition in the Senate was “some small-state senators 
convinced that direct vote would leave their states helpless in the hands of 
large populous states”). 
386. See Bickel, supra note 158, at 9 (observing that, while the electoral college 
disadvantages small states in many ways, it also has “symbolic value . . . for 
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not particularly advantage most small states, they would be even worse 
off under a popular vote scheme. Wyoming, for example, represents 
about half of one percent of the electoral vote, but less than one fifth 
of one percent of the population of voters in presidential contests.387 As 
a solidly Republican small state, Wyoming gets virtually no attention 
in presidential contests, but it would have even less significance under 
a popular vote scheme. Further, small swing states, such as New 
Hampshire, would suffer a dramatic loss of relevance.388 
While much harder to quantify, it seems plausible that the two-
vote bonus also plays a disproportionate role in the views of the minor-
ity of Americans who oppose abolishing the electoral college.389 As pre-
viously described, media coverage of the electoral-popular splits of 2000 
and 2016 have frequently attributed the outcomes in these elections to 
the operation of the two-vote bonus—with some justification in 2000, 
though less so in 2016. Academic perspectives on the electoral college 
likewise have often focused on the bonus as its key mechanism of 
operation.390 This framing may contribute to the belief that the Elec-
toral College gives the Republican Party a structural advantage, even 
though, in recent elections, the two-vote bonus has benefited Democrats 
and Republicans with about the same frequency.391 Further, insofar as 
the two-vote bonus is popularly considered to be the electoral college’s 
most salient feature, it may invest the electoral college with an 
unwarranted legitimacy. The Great Compromise between large and 
 
the small states, since the electoral college, on its face, confirms the federal 
structure, and in some measure the equality, as in the Senate, of all states, 
large and small.”). 
387. Wyoming has three electoral votes out of a total of 538. In 2016, 
approximately 255,849 votes for president were cast in Wyoming out of 
137,125,484 nationwide. Leip, supra note 62. 
388. While small swing states like New Hampshire would also lose considerable 
influence under a system of proportional allocation, they would obviously 
lose somewhat less were they permitted to retain the two-vote bonus. 
Further, it might be argued that their contributions to the national total 
would more accurately reflect their citizens’ preferences. 
389. The majority of Americans have generally supported abolition of the electoral 
college, although the percentage declined in the immediate wake of the 2016 
election. See Terence P. Jeffrey, Support for Abolishing Electoral College Hits 
Historic Low in Gallup Poll, CNSNews (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.cnsnews. 
com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/support-abolishing-electoral-college-hits-
historic-low-gallup-poll [https://perma.cc/QEM6-KTR4]. 
390. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 109, at 192–94 (defending the electoral 
college on the basis that its “deviation from population apportionment . . . is 
justified in order to serve federalism,” but discussing only the two-vote 
bonus as a source of such deviation). 
391. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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small states in legislative representation was, for better or worse, an 
important precondition to agreement on a constitution.392 To the extent 
the electoral college is seen primarily as a device for protecting the 
interests of small states, it may be regarded—even if incorrectly—as 
embodying an equally significant compromise and one that likewise re-
flects the United States’ founding principles. 
As with the two-vote bonus, a system that includes population-
based allocation can be defended on various grounds. Some critiques of 
direct election have praised the population-based allocation of the 
electoral college as limiting states’ abilities to game national results by 
“enfranchising or disenfranchising . . . a small set of [their] citizens”393 
while also providing “virtual representation” to nonvoting popula-
tions.394 Further, as with removing the two-vote bonus, a shift from 
population-based representation to the de facto voter-based represent-
tation of direct election would produce losers as well as winners among 
states, meaning that states with large populations of noncitizens or 
others who do not vote might be more likely to oppose it. 
Thus, reformers should perhaps not dismiss out of hand methods 
other than direct election. For example, some proposals to allocate elec-
toral votes proportionally may merit consideration. Such proposals 
would, of course, have to be carefully designed. In contrast to the state-
by-state action envisioned under the National Popular Vote Compact, 
for example, proportional representation would need to be accomplished 
by constitutional amendment to be fair and effective; indeed, attempts 
to advance the issue at the state level could be exploited dangerously 
for partisan advantage.395 Further, to avoid the need for arbitrary 
rounding, such a system would need to provide a mechanism for trans-
lating fractional percentage points into electoral votes, either by 
allowing fractional votes to be cast or by massively increasing the 
number of electors allotted per state. Finally, because many first-place 
candidates under such a system would be likely to attain only a 
plurality of electoral votes,396 the Twelfth Amendment provisions calling 
 
392. See supra Section I.A. 
393. See Muller, supra note 93, at 1241 (noting that such a move has the potential 
to “dramatically affect national elections”). 
394. See id. at 1243 (“[T]he Electoral College was founded upon a kind of 
republican vision of virtual representation in which a number of residents 
(including women, children, aliens, non-property owners, and, in part, slaves) 
would be included in a state’s population tally for the allocation of electoral 
votes (and for that state’s representation in the House of Representatives).”). 
395. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
396. In the 2000 election, for example, it is likely that neither candidate would 
have won a majority of electoral votes had a proportional system been used. 
See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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for such elections to be resolved by the House would likely have to be 
changed. This could be accomplished by lowering the required threshold 
for victory to 40 percent, awarding electors only to candidates who 
exceeded a vote percentage—such as the 15 percent used in Democratic 
primaries397—or providing for runoff elections if no candidate achieved 
a majority. 
The need for such fixes would certainly create a system more com-
plex than choosing a president by national popular vote, but one no 
more complex than the present method—and that would have some 
advantages. It would keep the states the primary administrators of the 
voting process, allowing them to set rules regarding eligibility and vot-
ing methods. Depending on its design, it could preserve the electoral 
college’s ceremonial role in U.S. public life, allowing for the familiar 
ritual of electors meeting in state capitols to cast their votes.398 Most 
important, however, it would target the winner-take-all problem while 
potentially allowing the other electoral college features to be preserved. 
Electoral votes would continue to be population-based, and a propor-
tional scheme would work equally well whether or not small states are 
allotted disproportionate representation399—allowing for a frank debate 
on that issue that could take place separately from the discussion of the 
merits of the electoral college as a whole. 
None of this is to deny serious problems with proportional schemes. 
Particularly if the two-vote bonus were retained,400 the potential for an 
 
397. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. See also Lessig, supra note 22 
(presenting results of proportional allocation of electoral votes in 2016 using 
a 5 percent threshold). 
398. It has sometimes been assumed that proportional allocation that included 
fractional votes would eliminate the role of human electors, given that “since 
an actual elector, who is a real person, cannot give six-tenths of their vote 
to one person and four-tenths to another.” See David S. Wagner, Note, The 
Forgotten Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in Electoral College Reform 
and the Use of Ballot Initiatives to Effect That Change, 25 Rev. Litig. 575, 
586 (2006). However, given the current role of electors as passive ratifiers of 
their state’s results rather than independent agents exercising their own 
decision-making abilities, there seems no reason why a similarly ceremonial 
role for human electors in a fractional-vote system could not be devised if it 
were thought desirable. Of course, the practice of using human electors could 
easily be eliminated as well. 
399. While most proposals for fractional proportional representation have 
included the two bonus votes, it is of course no more difficult to conceive a 
system in which states retain only their population-based electoral votes. 
This design would eliminate two of the Electoral College’s counter-
majoritarian features—winner-take-all and the “constant two”—while 
continuing population-based representation. 
400. Even disregarding the two-vote bonus, there are other ways in which it would 
be theoretically possible in such a system for the popular vote winner to lose 
the electoral college. The candidate could win disproportionately in high-
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electoral-popular split would remain—indeed, such a potential would 
be built into the system by design. Had a proportional system been in 
place, it may have prevented some popular-electoral splits including 
both 1876 and 1888,401 but it might have created others, such as 1960, 
in which Nixon—who lost the popular vote by just over 100,000 
votes,402—would, under one analysis, have led by one-half of an electoral 
vote.403 As previously noted, however, the popular-electoral splits 
created by a proportional scheme might be more justifiable, since they 
would reflect a deliberate decision to give greater weight to small states 
and states with a higher proportion of nonvoters. A proportional scheme 
could also be designed to minimize the likelihood of a runner-up presi-
dent by, for example, including a runoff provision if no candidate won 
a majority. 
Other issues are more technical. The proportional system would be 
complicated, requiring not only the oddity of fractional allocation of 
votes but additional measures to prevent plurality-winner elections 
from being decided by the House.404 Further, unless the basis under 
which electoral votes are initially awarded to states were also changed, 
electoral votes are currently rounded and thus represent an inexact 
method of population-based allocation.405 It has also been observed that, 
because electoral vote allocations are based on past censuses, they do 
not accurately reflect population totals at the time of voting.406 None-
 
turnout states, thus accumulating many additional votes while still being 
subject to those states’ electoral-vote caps. In a close election, arbitrary 
variations due to rounding in each state’s allocation of electoral votes could 
also produce or contribute to similar disparities. 
401. See Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 46. 
402. Leip, supra note 62. 
403. See Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 46. 
404. Runoff provisions, for example, have proved controversial in congressional 
debate over electoral college alternatives. See supra note 351 and 
accompanying text. 
405. For example, California’s current allotment of fifty-three electoral votes—
disregarding the two-vote bonus—represents 12.16 percent of the total pool 
of 436 population-based electoral votes. This is an approximate representation 
of California’s 12.07 percent of the population in the 2010 census but not an 
exact one, and the difference could lead to slight distortions in the result even 
if electoral votes were awarded proportionately. QuickFacts: California, U.S. 
Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/CA,US/ 
PST040216 [https://perma.cc/5PHE-YZYL] (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
Changing the system by which states are initially allocated popular votes is 
of course possible, but would further complicate an already somewhat 
byzantine proposal and destroy the symmetry between electoral votes and 
congressional representation. 
406. See Longley & Braun, supra note 2, at 96. 
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theless, these problems are not necessarily unresolvable. The Demo-
cratic primary experience with proportional delegate allocation, for 
example, suggests possible ways a proportional system could be suc-
cessfully designed, and rounding issues are likely to be minor enough to 
be inconsequential in the vast majority of elections.407 
A more indirect way of diluting the impact of winner-take-all is the 
so-called “national bonus plan”—a 1978 proposal by the think tank-
sponsored Task Force on Reform of the Presidential Election Process 
whose members included Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and 
Patrick Caddell, among many other notable figures.408 Under this plan, 
the existing 538 electoral votes would be allocated as usual, but an 
additional 102 votes—two for each state plus the District of Colum-
bia—would be allocated to the popular vote winner.409 The national 
bonus plan attracted little public or congressional support at the time 
it was introduced—it was a compromise that pleased no one, and even 
one of the task force members, Neil R. Peirce, regarded it as inferior to 
direct election.410 Nonetheless, a few commentators have urged renewed 
consideration of the plan in light of the popular-electoral splits of 2000 
and 2016,411 and the plan, despite the scant attention it received when 
proposed, has much to recommend it. 
The national bonus plan clearly does not alter winner-take-all 
directly,412 and some might regard it as adding another complication to 
what one commentator has described as the “Rube Goldberg contrap-
 
407. For example, while California’s share of the population does differ from its 
share of the electoral vote, the difference is relatively trivial—less than a 
tenth of a percentage point. See supra note 405. 
408. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 130; Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force, supra note 125 at 5. 
409. Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 130. 
410. See Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 15 for 
Peirce’s “partial dissent” praising the national bonus plan as “an innovative, 
commendable proposal that might well break the longstanding logjam on 
electoral college reform” but “dissent[ing] . . . from the Task Force’s 
suggestion that the national bonus plan would be preferable to direct 
election.” 
411. See Chad Bickley, Electoral College: Keep, Reform, Replace?, Detroit 
Free Press (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/ 
contributors/2016/11/18/electoral-college-keep-reform-replace/94068566/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4VF-XXUD]; see also Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Bolster 
the Old System with Bonuses, L.A. Times (Dec. 17, 2000), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2000/dec/17/opinion/op-1069 [https://perma.cc/9AQP-FUT2]. 
412. Indeed, in some respects it adds to it, by creating a national pool of winner-
take-all votes available to a candidate who wins the popular vote by even a 
minuscule margin. 
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tion”413 that is the electoral college. Nonetheless, it would substantially 
dilute the more pernicious effects of state-by-state winner-take-all, 
making it unlikely that a small-margin win in even the largest few swing 
states would be decisive and thus lessening incentives to pander, cheat, 
or suppress in order to gain small numbers of votes. By making swing-
state votes less likely to be individually decisive, it would also lessen 
the vast disparities in voting power between members of different 
states, while preserving the symbolic bonus given to small-state 
residents. Further, although it would not completely eliminate the pos-
sibility of popular-electoral splits,414 it would render such splits ex-
ceedingly improbable.415 Notably, the bonus plan would have resulted 
in the election of the popular-vote winner in all historical popular-
electoral splits, including the election of 2016.416 At the same time, the 
bonus plan’s retention of the electoral college’s basic structure might 
appeal to those who fear the unforeseen consequences of more radical 
change, and it would mitigate what some detractors have seen as the 
undesirable pure majoritarianism of direct election by forcing candi-
dates to strike a balance between campaigning in high-population areas 
and appealing to a coalition of states with attainable electoral votes. 
Finally, in contrast to proportional plans, the bonus-vote idea is fairly 
straightforward to grasp and would require fewer potentially divisive 
choices about how it should be structured. At the time the plan was 
proposed, task force member Neil R. Peirce—while continuing to believe 
that direct election was overall the preferable choice—nonetheless ac-
knowledged both that the bonus plan was more politically feasible to 
enact and that it would be “infinitely preferable” to no change at all.417 
Some may come away from the preceding discussion, of course, still 
convinced that direct election is the superior option and one worthy of 
continued advocacy. Even if, however, reform advocates continue to 
advocate for direct election as the best alternative, concentrating their 
critiques on winner-take-all rather than other electoral college features 
may help win additional support for their plan. Despite the near-
 
413. See Garrett Epps, No, Electors in States Trump Won Should Not Vote for 
Clinton, Atlantic (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2016/11/the-electoral-college-is-bad-subverting-it-now-is-bad-for-
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414. See Abbott & Levine, supra note 6, at 131 (noting that a small probability 
of such a split would remain in close elections). 
415. See id. 
416. All such splits involved electoral-vote margins less than 102. The highest 
electoral-vote margin of victory of a popular-vote loser was Donald Trump’s 
2016 margin of seventy-four. Not considering faithless electors, Trump won 
306-232 based on the election night results. See Leip, supra note 62. 
417. See Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 125, at 15. 
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unanimity of academic opinion that the winner-take-all feature is the 
greatest contributor to the electoral college’s undemocratic effects,418 
the other elements of the electoral college often loom larger in popular 
and media commentary. In 2016, for example, the winner-take-all 
feature played the most significant role in the popular-electoral split,419 
but many media accounts focused on other factors, attributing 
Clinton’s electoral loss, for example, to “our odd electoral system [that] 
gives more weight to voters in small, rural, mostly white states”420 or to 
the “outsized clout” the electoral college gives to “heavily populated 
states” that suppress voting rights.421 While these are perfectly legit-
imate critiques of the electoral college, it is misleading to suggest that 
these electoral college attributes brought about the 2016 result or are 
likely to have the greatest effect in future elections. All electoral systems 
have advantages and disadvantages; emphasizing that the dominant 
feature of the electoral college is also its most pernicious and in-
defensible might help to put into perspective whatever difficulties may 
attend direct election. 
3. Using the Courts to Undermine Winner-Take-All 
As a final note, some commentators have explored the possibility 
of judicial challenges to winner-take-all. In the aftermath of the 2016 
election, Lawrence Lessig wrote an article promoting the analysis of an 
Atlanta lawyer, Jerry L. Sims, who argued that state use of a winner-
take-all system violates the Equal Protection Clause by “den[ying] the 
minority of voters within each state any representation whatsoever 
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a half-century ago that Electoral College critics have considered winner-take-
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within the Electoral College.”422 Even though such reasoning may be 
persuasive in the abstract, it is hard to imagine these lines of argument 
meeting with much judicial receptiveness. Because of the sheer length 
of time winner-take-all has been in place, casting doubt on its con-
stitutionality would be massively disruptive. Further, the Supreme 
Court has already given at least some consideration to the issue. In 
1969, the Court issued a per curiam affirmance of Williams v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections,423 in which a district court rejected an equal 
protection challenge to use of the “general ticket”—another term for 
winner-take-all—in Virginia. The Court found that there was no 
“invidious” discrimination against voters for the losing candidate be-
cause, in a formal sense, everyone had the same opportunity to cast a 
ballot: “Every citizen is offered equal suffrage and no deprivation of the 
franchise is suffered by anyone.”424 Notably, two federal district courts 
were asked in the wake of the 2016 election to consider suits raising 
similar issues, and declined to consider them on grounds that Williams 
precluded them from revisiting the questions at hand.425 
Even if ineffective in court, however, the critiques of litigants should 
have persuasive force in pointing out the anomalous nature of winner-
take-all in U.S. voting practices. As one commentator has pointed out, 
many of the defenses of winner-take-all would sound absurd if advanced 
in the context of an internal state election.426 Indeed, in Gray v. 
Sanders,427 the Supreme Court forcefully rejected an electoral college-
like system at the state level. The case involved Democratic primary 
elections in Georgia, in which counties were given a number of “unit 
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votes” equal to twice their number of state representatives.428 Unit votes 
were then awarded on a winner-take-all basis to the candidate attaining 
the highest number of popular votes in that county.429 This created 
severe inequities in representation: a unit vote in Georgia’s least 
populous county represented 938 residents, while a unit vote in its most 
populous county represented 92,721 residents.430 In a 7-1 opinion, the 
Court forcefully rejected this system as a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, asking rhetorically: “How . . . can one person be given twice 
or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide election 
merely because he lives in a rural area . . . ?”431 Interestingly, the Court 
appeared to recognize the similarities between Georgia’s system and the 
electoral college, but dismissed the comparison as inapposite on the 
ground that the electoral college was “designed by men who did not 
want the election of the President to be left to the people”432—an odd 
argument given that winner-take-all systems in their current form were 
not anticipated by the Framers433 and do, in fact, leave the matter to 
the people in some sense by putting the choice of electors to popular 
vote. 
There is some constitutional basis for distinguishing cases like Gray 
from challenges to states’ use of winner-take-all rules in presidential 
elections, since Article II, § 1 has been construed to invest states with 
plenary discretion to assign their electors as they see fit, including 
through appointment without a popular vote, a practice that would cer-
tainly be widely condemned as undemocratic if instituted today.434 Yet 
as a matter of logic, fairness, and policy, the winner-take-all system 
makes as little sense in presidential contests as it did in Gray. Oppo-
nents of winner-take-all in the electoral college can thus forcefully argue 
that, while states using winner-take-all may technically be acting within 
their constitutional discretion, such rules are nonetheless in a broader 
sense inconsistent with constitutional values. 
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Conclusion 
The electoral college has at least three mechanisms—the two-vote 
bonus, population-based allocation, and winner-take-all award of each 
state’s votes—that have the potential to produce results distinct from 
those that would be achieved by direct election. While all three can be 
subject to reasonable criticism, the winner-take-all mechanism stands 
out starkly as the most harmful and least defensible. In contrast to the 
first two features, winner-take-all evolved wholly haphazardly at the 
state rather than federal level and did so as a result of narrow partisan 
jockeying, not reasoned debate or compromise. Moreover, winner-take-
all produces pernicious effects ranging from popular-electoral splits to 
wide divergences in voter power that have proved troublesome through-
out history and continue to be so today. At the same time, defenses of 
winner-take-all as a specific practice, when divorced from support from 
the electoral college in general, are few and unconvincing. As a result, 
advocates for electoral college reform should make abolition of winner-
take-all central to both their critiques of the current process and their 
evaluation of reform proposals. 
 
